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Hedonic Estimation under Very General Conditions Using 
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs1 
 
This paper develops a generalized hedonic model in which an exogenous shock to a single 
product attribute can affect other attributes, the markets for the product’s complements and 
substitutes, and aggregate quantity produced. These factors are shown to be empirically 
relevant and to cause bias in traditional approaches. Experimental and quasi-experimental 
estimators of attribute demand are introduced that address these biases, are transparent, 
and are straightforward to implement. One of these estimators is applied to measure the 
marginal military recruit’s valuation of educational benefits, which is found to range across 
packages from -$0.024 to +$0.467 per dollar of benefits. 
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Hedonic estimation, or the measurement of “marginal willingness to pay” (MWTP) for product 
attributes, is a vital tool for measuring the benefits of public policies that improve safety or 
environmental, school, or health care quality (e.g., Black, 1999; Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Cutler, 
Rosen, and Vijan, 2006; Viscusi, 1993, 1996). Hedonic methods are used to understand the demand for 
heterogeneous goods such as automobiles, computers, food, housing, and jobs (e.g., Bajari and Benkard, 
2005; Hamermesh, 1999; Kiesel and Villas-Boas, 2007; Raff and Trajtenberg, 1995; Sheppard, 1999) and 
to calculate the Consumer Price Index and one fifth of expenditures in the Gross Domestic Product 
(Landefield and Grimm, 2000; Moulton, 2001). 
Reading the hedonics and discrete choice literature gives the impression that MWTP cannot be 
identified without imposing highly restrictive assumptions about utility and markets, even when a natural 
experiment is available. The existing models assume that unobserved product attributes are uncorrelated 
with observed ones or do not exist (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, BLP, 1995; Epple, 1987; Rosen, 1974). 
In quasi-experimental settings, this assumption rules out “endogenous attribute” effects, through which an 
exogenous shock to a housing attribute such as local school quality affects neighborhood composition, 
crime, and the types of peers in that school. These models also assume that the product of interest has no 
complements or substitutes, so that a location-specific attribute like weather cannot affect the labor 
market as well as the housing market.2 They also assume that the aggregate quantity consumed is 
exogenous and does not respond to price changes.3
There is a widespread belief in the literature that these restrictions are appropriate and necessary 
to estimate MWTP. Applied studies of heterogeneous goods generally employ slight modifications of 
these frameworks or measure reduced-form price effects without estimating MWTP. Much of the recent 
empirical work in hedonic estimation focuses on quasi-experiments, and some innovative studies have 
incorporated quasi-experimental variation into existing hedonic or discrete choice models (e.g., Bayer, 
Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007; Berry and Haile, 2010; Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Klaiber and Smith, 
2009; Kuminoff and Pope, 2010a, 2010b; Lewbel, 2000; Parmeter and Pope, forthcoming).
 
4
                                                          
2 Roback (1982) allows for this one exception of housing and labor however, the literature generally ignores this and 
other possible interactions, such as effects of location-specific attributes on the prices of local goods. 
 No previous 
hedonic or discrete choice frameworks allow for unobserved product attributes that are affected by 
3 Rosen (1974) and Epple (1987) additionally require that markets are “thick,” so that every conceivable product is 
available, and that supply is perfectly competitive. BLP (1995) additionally require specific functional forms for 
utility and firm costs and a specific distribution for heterogeneity in preferences. 
4 These studies relax some important assumptions typically used in the literature but are generally faithful to those 
previous models. Additionally, some recent theoretical studies relax the functional form assumptions from these 
models but leave the frameworks largely intact (e.g., Athey and Imbens, 2007; Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim, 
2004; Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim, 2010). 
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exogenous shocks, complements or substitutes with the good of interest, and aggregate quantities that 
vary.5
The stylized frameworks used in previous hedonic and discrete choice studies are valuable as 
economic models. They shed light on the tradeoffs that occur in markets for heterogeneous goods and the 
patterns that one might expect to see in the data. For the purposes of measurement and policy evaluation, 
however, it is desirable to have robust hedonic estimators whose results are correct generally, and not 
only in the special cases described by these models. This paper demonstrates the identifiability of MWTP 
without imposing any of the restrictions described above, and it presents simple and straightforward 
estimators of MWTP and related measures for use in experimental and quasi-experimental settings. 
 
Section II of this study provides an intuitive discussion of the types of bias that endogenous 
omitted attributes, complement and substitute goods, and aggregate quantity effects generate in traditional 
approaches. That section also presents evidence from the housing and labor markets in Alaska that these 
biases are empirically relevant. 
Section III summarizes the estimators developed in this study to address these biases. Of the 
seven estimators presented in this study, the first ones use the least restrictive modeling assumptions but 
have the most demanding data requirements. The modeling assumptions are more restrictive and the data 
requirements less demanding with successive estimators, and the last one presented is the closest to 
existing quasi-experimental hedonic estimators. 
Section IV adapts Jones’s (1984) general model of the demand for heterogeneous goods to a 
hedonic framework. That section introduces concepts, notation, and a minimal set of assumptions 
necessary to define MWTP. The focus of this study is identification, and additional assumptions are not 
imposed to ensure the existence of equilibrium. The model is compatible with competitive or strategic 
equilibria provided that such additional assumptions are imposed. 
Sections V and VI describe in detail the experiments and quasi-experiments that are proposed in 
this study. Section V develops nonparametric experimental estimators that identify the entire distribution 
across consumers of the demand for a given product attribute. Section VI develops experimental and 
quasi-experimental estimators of the aggregate demand for a product attribute among a population of 
consumers. The experimental estimators used in this study avoid the effects of endogenous omitted 
attributes and complement and substitute goods by offering products and subsidies to small numbers of 
consumers. The quasi-experimental estimators exploit variation across consumers or economies to 
disentangle the direct effects of a change in a product attribute on quantity demanded of a good and the 
                                                          
5 Only Roback (1982) allows for one type of complementarity (housing and jobs), and only Bartik (1987) considers 
the case in which aggregate quantities vary. BLP (1995) allow for market shares (but not aggregate quantity 
produced) to vary. No framework has addressed more than one of these biases. 
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indirect effects of the change on other attributes and prices, which have their own effects on quantity 
demanded of the good. 
The estimators developed in this paper rely upon straightforward identification proofs, are 
transparent, and are considerably easier to implement than are previous hedonic and discrete choice 
estimators. Variations on these estimators have been applied in recent studies to estimate the value of 
freedom from jail, the demand for avoiding the Vietnam draft, the value of a statistical life, and the 
demand for class size reductions in elementary school (Abrams and Rohlfs, 2011; Rohlfs, 2012; Rohlfs, 
Sullivan, and Kniesner, 2013; Rohlfs and Zilora, 2013). Section VII applies one of the estimators of 
aggregate demand for an attribute to measure the value that military recruits place on funds for higher 
education. Contributions to an education account are found to have been valued at $0.24 to $0.47 per 
dollar of benefits, and direct tuition and stipend support is found to have been valued at -$0.02 to $0.08 
per dollar of benefits. Section VIII concludes. 
 
II. ILLUSTRATION OF BIAS IN HEDONIC MODELS 
  To illustrate the sources of bias that the current study addresses, let 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑡 be the average price 
of house ℎ in year 𝑡. Let 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 be an observable attribute about house ℎ, such as local school quality. The 
value of 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 is determined by a quasi-experiment so that it varies exogenously across locations and over 
time. Let 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 be an attribute about house ℎ that is difficult to measure, such as the pleasantness of 
neighbors in the area. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑡 is a linear function of the two attributes and an error term denoting 
unobserved attributes: 
(1) 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑧1ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑧2ℎ𝑡 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡 
The aim of a hedonic price regression in this case is to identify 𝛽1, the effect of attribute 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 on housing 
prices, holding all other attributes constant. Once identified, this price effect is used in a second-stage 
procedure to estimate MWTP for 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 (Epple, 1987; Rosen, 1974).
6
The assignment of 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 is essentially random, and 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 is consequently uncorrelated with any 
predetermined factors that influence 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑡. An improvement in school quality, however, will cause 
affluent and educated people to move into the area. Supposing that being affluent and educated is 
correlated with being a pleasant neighbor, the school quality improvement will directly affect the 
pleasantness of neighbors. If 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 is not included as a control in the regression, OLS estimates of 
Equation 1 measure the reduced-form effect of the shock to school quality on 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑡 and not the 
structural parameter 𝛽1. This reduced-form effect includes the direct effect of 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 and the indirect effects 
 For this second stage to produce 
accurate estimates, the estimates from the hedonic regression must be consistent. 
                                                          
6 The procedure proposed by BLP (1995) is different from that described here, but BLP require consistent estimation 
of the effect of the attribute on the decision to purchase the product. 
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of 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 through the mechanism of 𝑧2ℎ𝑡. Hence, OLS produces a biased estimate of 𝛽1, and the magnitude 
of the bias is 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧1ℎ𝑡, 𝑧2ℎ𝑡). Even if data were available on 𝑧2ℎ𝑡, the values of this second attribute 
were not assigned through a quasi-experiment and are likely to be correlated with 𝜀ℎ𝑡. Consequently, 
without an instrument for 𝑧2ℎ𝑡, an OLS regression of 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑡 on 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 and 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 will produce biased 
estimates of 𝛽2, and by failing to adequately control for 𝑧2ℎ𝑡, the regression will also produce biased 
estimates of 𝑧1ℎ𝑡.
7
The pleasantness of neighbors is not unique in this regard. Many location-specific attributes are 
influenced by the composition of local residents and businesses. Such attributes will vary in response to 
any exogenous shock that causes consumers or firms to move. Similar biases arise in the markets for labor 
and schooling, where some workers’ and students’ behaviors affect the quality of the environment 
experienced by other workers and students.
 
8
 A similar form of bias arises if goods exist that are complements or substitutes with housing. One 
key interaction is between the markets for housing and labor. Consumers often decide where to live based 
upon job availability, and the types of jobs that are available in an area affect housing prices and the types 
of people who live there. Additionally, consumers who are considering buying a home in an area consider 
the local price level and the quality and variety of local goods. Hence, local job characteristics and local 
prices are location-specific attributes that should be included in Equation 1. In addition to being difficult 
to measure in an exhaustive way, these factors are probably correlated with 𝜀ℎ𝑡, and adequately 
controlling for these variables would require finding a credible instrument for each one. 
 In general, 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 should be treated as an endogenous variable 
that may change in response to a shift in 𝑧1ℎ𝑡. 
 The two-by-two matrix in Figure 1 illustrates how omitted attributes and products will bias OLS 
estimates of 𝛽1. The sign of the bias depends on the signs of its two components, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧1ℎ𝑡, 𝑧2ℎ𝑡) and 𝛽2. 
The first component, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧1ℎ𝑡, 𝑧2ℎ𝑡) indicates the extent to which an increase in 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 increases or 
decreases the supply of 𝑧2ℎ𝑡. In the housing market, a positive improvement in one location-specific 
attribute like school quality might attract affluent and educated homebuyers and high-end businesses to 
the area. These changes would probably reduce crime, improve neighborhood cleanliness, and increase  
                                                          
7 If 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 is observable and data are available for some period preceding the shock to school quality, then one might 
consider instrumenting for 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 with the pre-treatment levels of that attribute. In general, however, this geographic 
variation in 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 will be correlated with many unobservable location-specific determinants of home value. Suppose, 
for example, that an additional omitted attribute 𝑧3ℎ𝑡 is the natural beauty of the area, which is time-invariant, 
positively correlated with 𝑧2ℎ𝑡, and positively valued by consumers. Instrumenting for 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 with the pre-treatment 
value will produce an upward-biased estimate of 𝛽2 that captures the effects of both pleasantness of neighbors 
(which changes in response to a shock to school quality) and natural beauty (which is time-invariant, does not 
respond to the shock, and should not appear in the set of controls). Supposing that 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑧1ℎ𝑡 , 𝑧2ℎ𝑡), 𝛽1, and 𝛽2 are all 
positive, this upward bias in the estimation of 𝛽2 will generate a downward bias in the estimation of 𝛽1, so that the 
researcher attributes too much of 𝑧1ℎ𝑡’s effects on housing prices to the increase in the pleasantness of neighbors. 
8 Another problem that is particular to labor market studies is that individual wages are determined by workplace 
amenities and worker productivity, both of which are endogenous and difficult to measure. 
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Figure 1: Direction of Bias due to Omitted Attributes or Products 
 
Omitted attribute or product is a . . . 
Good Bad 
Effect of attribute of 
interest on supply of 
omitted attribute or 
product 
Positive Positive Negative 
Negative Negative Positive 
 
the variety of local products. They would also increase congestion, prices, and tax rates. The second 
component, 𝛽2, indicates the extent to which 𝑧2ℎ𝑡 is a good or a bad in the typical consumer’s utility 
function. If increasing school quality increases the variety of local products and product variety is a good, 
then failing to control for product variety creates a positive bias in the estimation of 𝛽1, as in the upper 
left square of the matrix. If a school quality improvement reduces crime and crime is a bad, then failing to 
control for crime also creates a positive bias, as in the lower right of the matrix. If increasing school 
quality increases congestion and the local price level and both are bads, then failing to control for those 
factors creates a downward bias, as in the upper right of the matrix. 
 The third source of bias, variation in aggregate quantity, is illustrated in Figure 2, which is 
adapted from Bartik (1987), who originally discussed this problem. The lower demand curve in Figure 2 
plots consumer willingness to pay for living in that area before a school quality improvement. The higher 
demand curve shows willingness to pay for living in that area after the improvement. The benefit of the 
intervention is illustrated by the vertical difference in these two demand curves. The intervention’s effect 
on prices, which is shown on the vertical axis, will in general be smaller than the benefit of the 
intervention. The price difference will only equal this benefit in the special case that supply is perfectly 
inelastic. In general, the price difference may equal MWTP in the short run, when quantity is fixed. In the 
long run, however, quantity will increase, and this price difference will shrink. 
To illustrate the practical importance of these three sources of bias, panel A of Figure 3 shows 
indices of the rental price of housing in the Anchorage, Alaska and Portland-Salem, Oregon areas from 
1970 to 2009, and panels B and C show per capita earnings and state population as fractions of the 1970 
levels in Alaska and Oregon. In the 1970s, rent and wages increased due to a temporary rise in labor  
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demand associated with oil pipeline construction (Carrington, 1996). They rose again in the 1980s due to 
growth in the oil industry and the 1982 initiation of annual cash payments to every resident (Alaska 
Permanent Fund Corporation, 2009; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010). Both increases 
underscore the extent to which wages and home prices are simultaneously determined. Measuring the 
total benefit of an oil boom or transfer program requires examining the effects on both rents and wages. 
The 1980s price increase was temporary and probably reflected the inability of housing and labor supply 
to respond quickly to the rises in demand. In the long run, population increased, as shown in panel C, and 
prices dropped back to trend. These long run quantity responses (and corresponding drops in prices) are 
assumed not to occur in traditional hedonic models. The oil jobs and cash transfers both made Alaska a 
more desirable place to live; however, these improvements did not generate long term price changes, and 
a standard hedonic comparison of housing prices between 1990 and 1980 would incorrectly indicate that 
these changes provided little or no value. Additionally, the influx of people to Alaska probably affected 
school quality, crime, the income, education, age, and sex composition of neighborhoods, the variety of 
Willingness 
to Pay 
Effect of a one-
unit increase in 
𝑧1ℎ𝑡 on demand 
Demand for home with 𝑧1ℎ𝑡 = 0 
Aggregate quantity of houses 
Aggregate supply  










Figure 3: Housing Rental Prices, Per Capita Earnings, and Population in Alaska and Oregon, 1970-2009 
        Panel A: Housing Rental Price Index             Panel B: Per Capita Earnings 
    
Panel C: Population as a Fraction of 1970 Level 
 
Notes to Figure 3: Data for panel A taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010); earnings data for panel B taken from U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (2010); population data for panels B and C taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2010).
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local jobs, and the variety and prices of local products. Many of these changes are difficult to measure, 
and when they are measurable, it is unclear how one might control for them or combine these many 
responses into a single dollar value. 
 In the models of Rosen (1974) and Epple (1987), all of the benefits of a product improvement are 
capitalized into the price. In a more general framework in which supply is not perfectly inelastic, some of 
the benefits of the improvement will be capitalized into the price, and the remainder will be experienced 
as consumer surplus. If the affected product has complements or substitutes, the intervention could affect 
prices or production quantities for those other goods. Suppose, for example, that the supply of computers 
is perfectly competitive, but the supply of operating systems is controlled by a monopoly with inelastic 
supply. A technological innovation that increased computing speed could have no effect on the price of 
computers, but the producer of operating systems could raise its prices and keep output constant. 
BLP (1995) develop a discrete choice model in which the dependent variable is the decision to 
purchase a specific good, and the price of the good is an endogenous regressor. The quantity effects 
described in Figure 2 and illustrated in Figure 3 are partially considered in their model, as an exogenous 
shock to product attributes can affect prices and market shares – i.e., the fraction of sales accounted for by 
a single product – but not aggregate quantity produced. One limitation of BLP’s approach is that, in 
addition to having an instrument for the product attribute being studied, it is necessary to have an 
instrument that shifts prices but is unrelated to unobserved factors influencing demand. The types of 
quasi-experiments that generate valid instruments are rare, and it would be very unusual to have a single 
dataset in which separate plausible instruments existed for both an important product attribute and the 
price of the good. Due to this restriction, researchers using the BLP approach have been forced to use 
instruments for the price that probably do not satisfy the necessary exogeneity conditions. 
The current study addresses the problem of endogenous prices in two ways. For the first set of 
experimental estimators, the researcher offers products and subsidies to individual consumers. Offers 
made to these atomless consumers do not generate any general equilibrium responses in prices. For the 
second set of estimators developed in this study, it is necessary to have two samples: one in which there is 
exogenous variation in the product attribute being studied and another in which there is random variation 
in the price. The second sample is used to measure the slope of the demand curve for the product of 
interest. The estimated effects of the attribute on quantity consumed are used together with estimates of 
the slope of the demand curve to measure the vertical change in demand per additional unit of the 
attribute.  For this vertical change to be identified, the slope of the demand curve must be similar across 
the two samples. 
 
III. OVERVIEW OF ESTIMATORS 
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Table 1 describes the seven experimental and quasi-experimental estimation strategies that are 
developed in this study. These estimators illustrate what aspects of the demand for product attributes can 
be identified in different situations. Section V begins with an “idealized experiment” to highlight what 
assumptions are in principle necessary to identify MWTP. This new modeling concept serves as a 
theoretical benchmark to clarify the tradeoffs that researchers face between generality of the model and 
availability of experimental or quasi-experimental data. In the idealized experiment, the researcher has the 
ability to “treat” goods that a consumer purchases with an additional unit of the attribute of interest 𝑧𝑘. A 
small set of consumers is selected from the population, and each one is offered this treatment option at a 
different, randomly assigned price. Because this intervention only affects the small number of consumers 
participating in the study, it avoids biases from market-level changes to other attributes, other goods’ 
prices, or aggregate quantity. Through this idealized experiment it is possible to identify the distribution 
across consumers of the MWTP for the attribute 𝑧𝑘. In keeping with the policy focus of hedonic 
estimation, exclusive attention is paid to identification of the demand for product attributes, and extra 
assumptions are not imposed to identify utility or cost functions. 
The remainder of Section V develops alternative, practical estimators that identify the 
distributions across consumers of policy-relevant measures of product attribute demand that differ slightly 
from MWTP. The second estimator involves an “existing tradeoff experiment.” To conduct this 
experiment, the researcher identifies an existing subset of the population in which each individual faces a 
tradeoff between an “untreated” set of goods and a “treated” version that has an additional unit of 𝑧𝑘. The 
third estimator uses an “offer-restricted experiment,” in which the researcher artificially restricts 
consumers’ options to the untreated and treated sets of goods and provides financial compensation to the 
participants to induce them to accept this restriction. In both of these experiments, the researcher 
identifies the value of the treatment by randomly assigning subsidies for selecting the treatment option 
across consumers in the study. 
The estimators presented in Section VI compare total sales of untreated goods with their treated 
variants. For these research designs, some consumers face decisions between untreated goods and their 
best outside options, and others face decisions between treated goods and their outside options. Using 
these estimators, it is not possible to identify MWTP for any consumer, but it is possible to identify the 
effect of the attribute 𝑧𝑘 on aggregate surplus, the vertical increase in demand illustrated in Figure 2. The 
fourth estimator in this study uses a “randomized offer experiment.” The researcher offers each 
participant in the experiment a subsidized good. The level of 𝑧𝑘 in the offered good and the amount of the 
subsidy are randomized across consumers. The fifth estimator is based upon a “take-up study.” That study 
is similar to the randomized offer experiment, except that it involves two experiments: a “take-up 
experiment” and a “price experiment.” In the take-up experiment, the researcher makes subsidized 
10 
 
Table 1: Description of Estimators Developed in Study 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Estimator Research design Key Assumptions Identifies . . . Applications described in text 
1. Idealized Experiment 
Offer consumers the option to “treat” all of their goods 
in the market of interest with an additional unit of the 
attribute 𝑧𝑘. Randomize the price for the treated option 
across consumers 
Local non-satiation, price-taking 
consumers. 
Distribution across consumers 
of MWTP for an attribute 𝑧𝑘 
Home improvements, product 
upgrades, and attributes that are 
artificially tied to houses or jobs, 
such as school district access or 
health care coverage. 
2. Existing Tradeoff Experiment 
Identify consumers already making a decision between 
“treated” and “untreated” versions of the same good. 
Randomize subsidy for treated version across 
consumers. 
Same as idealized experiment. 
Distribution across subset of 
consumers facing tradeoff of 
MWTP for an attribute 𝑧𝑘 
The discount rate, the value of 
freedom from jail, and the value of 
a statistical life. 
3. Restricted Offer Experiment 
Pay consumers to restrict consumption in the market of 
interest to “treated” or “untreated” versions of the same 
good. Randomize price for treated version across 
consumers. 
Same as idealized experiment. 
Distribution across consumers 
of “offer-restricted MWTP” 
for an attribute 𝑧𝑘 
The value of doctor visits and 
medical treatment, the value of 
internet bandwidth, the discount 
rate. 
4. Randomized Offer Experiment 
Offer some consumers “untreated” goods other 
consumers “treated” goods, both at a subsidized rate, 
where the subsidy is randomly assigned across 
consumers. 
Same as idealized experiment. 
“Marginal Surplus” (i.e., the 
vertical difference between the 
treated and untreated demand 
curves) at all points along the 
demand curve. 
The value of different 
characteristics of small business 
loans or solicitations for charitable 
donations. 
5. Take-Up Estimator 
In a “take-up experiment,” offer some consumers 
“untreated” goods and other consumers “treated” 
goods, both at a subsidized rate. In a “price 
experiment,” randomly assign subsidies for untreated 
goods across consumers. 
Same as idealized experiment plus 
linear demand and the slope of the 
demand curve is the same between 
the take-up experiment and the 
price experiment. 
The Marginal Surplus for the 
marginal unit sold of the 
treated good. 
Racial preferences by employers, 
banks offering loans, or home 
sellers. Parents' valuations of 
reductions in elementary school 
class sizes. The value of Section 8 





There is an “aggregate treatment” that increases 
attribute 𝑧𝑘 by one unit a certain subset of goods for all 
consumers. Measure consumption of goods in that 
subset before and after the aggregate treatment for both 
affected and placebo consumers. Additionally, conduct 
a price experiment that randomly assigns subsidies for 
untreated goods across consumers. 
Same as take-up estimator plus 
there is a “placebo” group of 
consumers who are similar to other 
“affected” consumers but place no 
value on the attribute of interest. 
Affected and placebo consumers 
have equal responses to aggregate 
treatment’s effects on prices and on 
other attributes. 
The Marginal Surplus for the 
marginal unit sold of the 
treated good. 
Parental valuations of changes in 
school quality, worker valuations of 
health care benefits packages, the 
value of avoiding the Vietnam 
draft, military recruits' valuations of 





There is an “aggregate treatment” that increases 
attribute 𝑧𝑘 by one unit a certain subset of goods for all 
consumers. Measure consumption of goods in that 
subset before and after the aggregate treatment. 
Additionally, conduct a price experiment that randomly 
assigns subsidies for untreated goods across 
consumers. 
Same as take-up estimator plus 
there are no endogenous amenities 
except 𝑧𝑘, and the only price that 
responds to the shock is that of the 
product being studied. 
The Marginal Surplus for the 
marginal unit sold of the 
treated good. 
Any previous hedonic study that 
only examines price effects. 
Recently applied as a specification 
check in a study by Rohlfs (2011b) 
measuring consumer valuations of 
automobile air bags. 
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product offers in which the level of 𝑧𝑘 is randomized. In the price experiment, the researcher offers 
consumers products for which the subsidized price is randomized. For both the randomized offer 
experiment and the take-up study, the researcher compares the effect of 𝑧𝑘 on the demand for the offered 
good to the effect of the dollar subsidy to measure the subsidy amount that would increase demand by as 
much as the attribute does. Using the logic of Figure 2, these approaches consider a case in which the 
price difference is constant (so that the supply curve is effectively flat) and use the horizontal quantity 
difference together with the slope of the demand curve to identify the vertical increase in demand 
resulting from the increase in the attribute. For the take-up study, it is necessary to assume that the slope 
of the demand curve for the good (and hence the effect of the subsidy) is similar between the take-up 
experiment and the price experiment. 
The remaining estimators developed in Section VI examine quasi-experiments in which there is a 
shock that “treats” some goods for all consumers. The sixth approach, the “placebo consumers estimator” 
makes use of a placebo group of consumers who do not value the attribute of interest but are affected by 
the macroeconomic effects of the shock on endogenous omitted attributes and complements and 
substitutes for the good being studied. For example, if the shock is an improvement in school quality, 
non-parents might constitute a placebo group, as they are affected by the change in housing prices, but 
they do not value the treatment itself. A difference-in-differences design is used to disentangle the direct 
effects of the attribute of interest (which do not exist for placebo consumers) from the indirect effects on 
prices and other attributes (which do affect placebo consumers’ demand). The seventh approach, the 
“combined price and quantity study” considers a case in which there are no endogenous omitted attributes 
or complementary or substitute goods, so that the shock only affects the price and quantity demanded of 
the good being studied. The vertical increase in demand is estimated as the price change minus the slope 
of the demand curve times the quantity change. As with the take-up study, both the placebo consumers 
study and the price and quantity comparison study use data from the price experiment to convert the 
quantity effect into dollar units. Consequently, it is necessary in both studies to assume that the slope of 
the demand curve as estimated from the price experiment generalizes to these other contexts. 
 
IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The Consumption Decision 
Each good in the economy is heterogeneous and is defined by its levels of different attributes.9
                                                          
9 In the literature, product attributes are also referred to as amenities or product characteristics. 
 
Let 𝑚 be the number of attributes that define a good outside the market of interest, and let 𝑛 denote the 
number of product attributes in the market of interest. The numbers 𝑚 and 𝑛 of attributes are large and 
describe every conceivable feature of every good. Let 𝐗 ⊂ ℝ𝑚 denote the set of all conceivable goods 
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outside the market of interest, and let 𝐙 ⊂ ℝ𝑛 denote the set of all conceivable goods in the market of 
interest. Both 𝐗 and 𝐙 are compact and continuous. A single good 𝐱 ∈ 𝐗 or 𝐳 ∈ 𝐙 is a vector 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑚 or 
𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑛 of different attribute levels. If the market being studied is housing, then the attributes 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑚 
are sufficiently detailed that they uniquely identify every good that is not a house, and the attributes 
𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑛 describe home- and location-specific features such as square footage and local air quality. 
There is a mass 𝐈 = [0,1] of atomless consumers, indexed by 𝑖. Let the non-negative scalars 
𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐱) and 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) denote the quantities of goods 𝐱 and 𝐳 that 𝑖 consumes.10
CONSUMPTION BUNDLE: A consumption bundle for consumer 𝑖 consists of values 𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐱) and 
𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) for every 𝐱 ∈ 𝐗 and 𝐳 ∈ 𝐙. This consumption bundle is formally characterized as a pair (𝑞𝑥𝑖, 𝑞𝑧𝑖) of finite, non-negative measures 𝑞𝑥𝑖 on 𝐗 and 𝑞𝑧𝑖 on 𝐙.
 Following Jones (1984), 




A typical measure on a set 𝐗 ascribes a number such as “distance from the origin” to each subset of 𝐗, 
including single elements 𝐱. The measures 𝑞𝑥𝑖 and 𝑞𝑧𝑖 are defined similarly; however, the numbers 
ascribed to each subset of 𝐗 and 𝐙 are interpreted as “quantity consumed by 𝑖” rather than distance from 
the origin.12
Let the scalars 𝑝𝑥(𝐱) and 𝑝𝑧(𝐳) denote the market prices per unit of 𝐱 and 𝐳. Prices may be 
positive or negative. Price schedules are defined analogously to consumption bundles: 
 Defining these measures provides a compact way to represent consumers’ complete 
consumption bundles. The term consumption bundle will describe the pair (𝑞𝑥𝑖,𝑞𝑧𝑖), and each of the 
measures 𝑞𝑥𝑖 and 𝑞𝑧𝑖 will be referred to as a bundle of goods. Let the measure spaces ℳ𝑋 and ℳ𝑍 contain 
all of the finite measures 𝑞𝑥𝑖 on 𝐗 and 𝑞𝑧𝑖 on 𝐙, and let ℳ𝑋[0,+] and ℳ𝑍[0,+] be the subspaces of ℳ𝑋 and 
ℳ𝑍 that contain only non-negative measures. 
PRICE SCHEDULE: A price schedule consists of prices 𝑝𝑥(𝐱) and 𝑝𝑧(𝐳) for every 𝐱 ∈ 𝐗 and 
𝐳 ∈ 𝐙. Each price schedule is formally characterized as a pair (𝑝𝑥 ,𝑝𝑧) of signed and bounded 




In principle, this definition of prices implies a thick market in which every good in 𝐗 and 𝐙 can be 
purchased. As a practical matter, however, prices can vary discontinuously with the different attribute 
levels, and some prices may be very high, indicating a thin market in which those goods are effectively 
unavailable. The total cost of purchasing consumption bundle (𝑞𝑥𝑖, 𝑞𝑧𝑖) is ∫ 𝑝𝑥(𝐱) ∗ 𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐱)𝑑𝐱𝐗 +
                                                          
10 A static setting is considered here; however, it is straightforward to incorporate dynamics into the model by 
making “time in which the good is consumed” be one of the product attributes for both 𝐗 and 𝐙. 
11 All measures and subsets in this paper are defined in the Borel sense. 
12 For subsets of goods 𝐗𝐓 ⊆ 𝐗 and 𝐙𝐓 ⊆ 𝐙, the scalars 𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐗𝐓) = ∫ 𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐱)𝑑𝐱𝐗𝐓  and 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐙𝐓) = ∫ 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳)𝑑𝐳𝐙𝐓  denote 
the total quantities of goods within those sets that 𝑖 consumes. 
13 These measures are defined so that the scalars 𝑝𝑥(𝐗𝐓) = ∫ 𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐱)𝑑𝐱𝐗𝐓 ∫ 1𝑑𝐱𝐗𝐓�  and 
𝑝𝑧(𝐙𝐓) = ∫ 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳)𝑑𝐳𝐙𝐓 ∫ 1𝑑𝐳𝐙𝐓�  denote the average prices of goods within 𝐗𝐓 ⊆ 𝐗 or 𝐙𝐓 ⊆ 𝐙 
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∫ 𝑝𝑧(𝐳) ∗ 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳)𝑑𝐳𝐙 . For simplicity (and with apologies for the abuse of notation), the costs of 𝑞𝑥𝑖 and 
𝑞𝑧𝑖 are denoted 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑞𝑥𝑖 and 𝑝𝑧 ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖. 
Each consumer is endowed with a consumption bundle (𝜔𝑥𝑖,𝜔𝑧𝑖), with 𝜔𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℳ𝑋[0,+] and 
𝜔𝑧𝑖 ∈ ℳ𝑍[0,+]. Let the scalar 𝑤𝑖 denote 𝑖’s wealth 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝜔𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝𝑧 ∙ 𝜔𝑧𝑖. The distribution of wealth for the 
economy can be expressed as follows: 
WEALTH MEASURE. The wealth measure for the economy is a non-negative, finite measure 𝑤𝐈 
on 𝐈 that describes the wealth 𝑤𝐈(𝑖) = 𝑤𝑖 for each consumer 𝑖. 
 
To simplify the notation, let prices and the distribution of wealth together be summarized by a single 
measure, denoted the state of the economy: 
STATE OF THE ECONOMY. The state 𝑠 = (𝑝𝑥 ,𝑝𝑧,𝑤𝐈)  of the economy consists of a price 
schedule (𝑝𝑥 ,𝑝𝑧) and a wealth measure 𝑤𝐈. 
 
Let ℳ𝐈[0,+] denote the space of non-negative, finite measures on 𝐈, and let ℳ𝑠 denote the metric space 
ℳ𝑋 × ℳ𝑍 × ℳ𝐈[0,+] of possible states of the economy. 
Each consumer 𝑖 has a utility function 𝑢𝑖:ℳ𝑋[0,+] × ℳ𝑍[0,+] → ℝ. This function 𝑢𝑖(𝑞𝑥𝑖, 𝑞𝑧𝑖) 
depends upon 𝑖’s consumption levels 𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐱) and 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) for each good 𝐱 ∈ 𝐗 and 𝐳 ∈ 𝐙. Consumers take 
prices as given.14 Each consumer’s utility function is locally non-satiable – i.e., utility strictly increases 
with wealth. Utility may be non-separable across goods and non-monotonic and discontinuous in any of 
the goods.15
Consumer 𝑖 selects a consumption bundle (𝑞𝑥𝑖, 𝑞𝑧𝑖) to maximize 𝑢𝑖 subject to the constraint that 
𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑞𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝𝑧 ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖 ≤ 𝑤𝑖. The remainder of this paper assumes the existence of equilibrium prices and 
focuses on the identification of consumer demand for product attributes. Let the equilibrium price 
schedule be denoted (𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑝𝑧∗). Let 𝑖’s wealth 𝑝𝑥∗ ∙ 𝜔𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝜔𝑧𝑖 at these prices be denoted 𝑤𝑖∗, and let 𝑠𝑖∗ 
denote the state of the economy at these equilibrium prices. Let (𝑞𝑥𝑖∗ ,𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ ) denote the consumption bundle 
that solves 𝑖’s constrained maximization problem given market prices (𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑝𝑧∗), and let the scalar 𝑢𝑖∗ 
denote 𝑢𝑖(𝑞𝑥𝑖∗ , 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ ), the level of utility provided by 𝑖’s optimal consumption bundle. Supply may be 
competitive or non-competitive. In practice, additional assumptions about the market must be imposed if 
one wishes to ensure that an equilibrium exists. Production and equilibrium are discussed in the appendix. 
 Utility functions may vary in arbitrary ways across consumers; however, the quantities 
𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐱) and 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) are restricted to be measurable across agents for all 𝐱 and 𝐳, with the economy-wide 
levels of consumption of 𝐱 and 𝐳 represented by ∫ 𝑞𝑥𝑖(𝐱)𝑑𝑖𝐈  and ∫ 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳)𝑑𝑖𝐈  (cf., Aumann, 1964). 
                                                          
14 The restriction that consumers are price-taking is non-trivial. Ostroy (1984) shows that, when there is a continuum 
of atomless goods, atomless consumers can have market power. Such market power is ruled out here. 
15 Additionally, the convexity or concavity of 𝑢𝑖 in each good 𝐳 may vary with 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳). A sufficient but not necessary 
condition for this utility function to exist is that the preference relation is continuous in all good quantities and 
attributes, as is formally stated in Jones (1984, pg. 511). 
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Previous hedonic and discrete choice models by Rosen (1974), Epple (1987), and BLP (1995) are 
special cases of the framework described here. All of those models restrict the space 𝐗 to be a single 
point, so that the commodity space consists of 𝐙 and a homogeneous consumption good. In the housing 
market, a minor extension to the conventional models would allow 𝐗 to consist of two homogeneous 
goods, those purchased in Atlanta and those purchased in Boston. A home buyer would certainly take the 
price level into account when choosing where to live, and a change in weather or school quality in one of 
those cities could affect local prices for the homogeneous good as well as local housing prices. The full 
market response to the weather or school quality shock includes both the effect on housing prices and the 
effect on local prices for everything else. These local price effects, which are assumed not to exist in 
previous hedonic and discrete choice models, are easy to accommodate in the current setup. 
Another important type of complementarity occurs between jobs and housing in the same 
location. A firm hiring in Syracuse, New York (which receives 115 inches of snow per year) must pay a 
higher wage to obtain the same level of talent than does a similar firm hiring in San Francisco (which has 
year-round pleasant weather and is located on the coast). In the current model, one of the goods 𝐱 could 
be hours of work in a specific job in Syracuse, and another good 𝐱′ could be hours of work in a specific 
job in San Francisco. Each consumer would be endowed with quantities of 𝐱 and 𝐱′, which could be sold 
to the employer or consumed as leisure. The shape of the utility function would be such that selling hours 
to the firm in San Francisco (and failing to consume them as leisure) would greatly increase the utility 
benefit of housing in San Francisco. The goods 𝐱 and 𝐱′ would also be strong substitutes in the utility 
function, so that selling hours of work in San Francisco would sharply increase the utility cost of selling 
hours of work in Syracuse, and working jobs in both cities would be rare. 
In addition to ruling out substitutes and complements, previous hedonic models require that each 
consumer purchases exactly one unit of one good 𝐳 and zero units of every other good in 𝐙. In the market 
for housing, this restriction rules out any effects of prices or location-specific attributes on the decision to 
buy a home or the total number of home buyers.16
 
 In addition to allowing for endogenous 
homeownership, relaxing this restriction helps to describe markets in which consumers often buy more 
than one good, such as automobiles, computers, and even markets in which quantity consumed various 
continuously, as in foods, music, and vacations. 
                                                          
16 Additionally, Rosen and BLP assume that utility is a monotonic function of each attribute for all consumers and 
that production costs increase in each attribute for all firms. Rosen also assumes concave utility, convex costs, 
observability of every attribute, “thick” markets, and perfectly competitive firms. Epple uses the same set of 
assumptions but allows for the existence of unobservable attributes, provided that they are uncorrelated with 
geographic or temporal variation in observed attributes. BLP also assume that utility and log costs are linear, 
preference heterogeneity follows an exponential distribution, the one unobserved attribute is uncorrelated with 
observed ones and is valued the same by all buyers, and firms are oligopolists. 
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B. The Bid Function, Reservation Prices, and Consumer Surplus 
Following Rosen (1974), MWTP is expressed in terms of a bid function, reservation prices, and 
consumer surplus: 
BID FUNCTION: Consumer 𝑖’s bid function 𝜃𝑖:ℳ𝑍[0,+] × ℳ𝑋 × ℝ2 → ℝ gives the price 
𝜃𝑖(𝑞𝑧,𝑝𝑥 ,𝑤,𝑢) for a bundle of goods 𝑞𝑧 at which consuming that bundle and spending all 
remaining wealth optimally on goods in 𝐗 produces utility level 𝑢. Taking 𝑞𝑧,𝑝𝑥 ,𝑤 and 𝑢 as 
given and letting 𝜆𝑖 denote consumer 𝑖’s Lagrange multiplier, the bid function returns the value of 
𝜃 that satisfies max𝑞𝑥𝑖{𝑢𝑖(𝑞𝑥𝑖,𝑞𝑧) + 𝜆𝑖 ∗ [𝑤 − 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑞𝑥𝑖 − 𝜃]} = 𝑢. 
 
RESERVATION PRICE: Consumer 𝑖’s reservation price for the bundle 𝑞𝑧 equals 
𝜃𝑖(𝑞𝑧,𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑤𝑖∗,𝑢𝑖∗). This scalar measures the price for 𝑞𝑧 at which 𝑖 would be indifferent between 
purchasing 𝑞𝑧 or purchasing 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗  at the price 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ . 
 
CONSUMER SURPLUS: The consumer surplus to 𝑖 from consuming 𝑞𝑧 equals 
𝜃𝑖(𝑞𝑧,𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑤𝑖∗,𝑢𝑖∗) − 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑧. This scalar measures the excess value obtained from consuming 𝑞𝑧 at 
the price 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑧 rather than consuming 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗  at the price 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ . 
 
Local non-satiation guarantees that, for each 𝑞𝑧,𝑝𝑥 and 𝑤, there is no more than one value of 𝜃 at which 
𝑖’s utility equals 𝑢. If two prices 𝜃 and 𝜃′ produced the same utility level, with 𝜃 < 𝜃′, then a cash 
subsidy of 𝜃′ − 𝜃 would have no effect on utility, thus violating local non-satiation. Some values of 𝑢 
may not be achievable for a given bundle of goods 𝑞𝑧 due to a jump discontinuity in the utility function. 
In such cases, no 𝜃 solves the condition above, and 𝜃 is defined to equal the price of 𝑞𝑧 at the 
discontinuity point. Some bundles 𝑞𝑧 may be so undesirable that, if 𝑖 consumes 𝑞𝑧, no cash subsidy could 
increase utility to as high a level as 𝑢. In these cases, 𝜃 is defined to equal ∞. Other bundles may be so 
desirable that, if consumed, no tax could reduce utility to a level as low as 𝑢. In these cases, 𝜃 is defined 
to equal −∞. 
In a standard model of a homogeneous good, consumer 𝑖’s reservation price for the good is the 
price at which 𝑖 would be indifferent to purchasing the good or not. If this definition were used in the 
current context, 𝑖’s reservation price for the bundle 𝑞𝑧 would be evaluated at prices 𝑝𝑥∗ , wealth 𝑤𝑖∗, and 
the level of utility that 𝑖 would obtain if 𝑖 consumed zero goods in 𝐙 and spent all wealth optimally on 
goods in 𝐗. In the hedonic context, defining reservation prices in this way is problematic. For many 
heterogeneous goods such as housing, food, or medical care, it is not natural to think about what utility 
would be if no goods in 𝐙 were consumed. For this reason and following Rosen (1974), reservation prices 
and consumer surplus are defined using 𝑢𝑖∗ as a benchmark utility level. Consumer 𝑖’s reservation price 
𝜃𝑖(𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ ,𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑤𝑖∗,𝑢𝑖∗) for the bundle 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗  is necessarily 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ , and the consumer surplus to 𝑖 from consuming 
𝑞𝑧𝑖
∗  is necessarily zero. 
For a specific good 𝐳, the relationship between 𝜃𝑖 and 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) maps out an indifference curve 
showing the tradeoffs between dollars and units of 𝐳 consumed. The utility function may have an unusual 
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shape, but local non-satiation imposes some restrictions on how these indifference curves can look. 
Figure 4 shows examples of plots of 𝜃𝑖 against 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) for a single consumer. Panels A and C show bid-
quantity relationships that are allowed by the model, and panels B and D show bid-quantity relationships 
that violate the assumptions of the model. Panel A shows a typical pair of convex indifference curves. 
Utility is a decreasing function of the amount paid for 𝑞𝑧, and 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) is a good, so that utility is lowest in 
the upper left of the graph and highest in the lower right. In panel B, the indifference curves cross. At this 
crossing point, a single price 𝜃𝑖 and quantity 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) produce two different utility values 𝑢1 and 𝑢2, which 
violates the assumption that utility is a scalar-valued function. The indifference curves in panel C are non-
monotonic, take on negative values, have a jump discontinuity, and equal ∞ or −∞ for some values of 
𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳). The dashed horizontal and diagonal portions of the curves show 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) values at which 𝜃𝑖 is 
positive or negative infinity. Some of the undefined values appear on the lower curve. At these levels of 
𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳), it is possible to achieve a utility level of 𝑢1, but no cash payment could increase 𝑖’s utility to as 
high as 𝑢2. In order to satisfy local non-satiation and to avoid utility functions crossing, the bid function 
must also be undefined over the same range of 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) for all utility levels greater than 𝑢2. For the 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) 
values at which the higher curve has dashes, there is no tax that could reduce 𝑖’s utility to as low as 𝑢1. 
For local non-satiation to be satisfied, the bid function must also be undefined over the same range of 
𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) for all utility levels lower than 𝑢1. Panel D shows the same curves as in panel C but with two 
changes, both of which violate local non-satiation. First, at the jump discontinuity, there is a single 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) 
at which the bid function takes on two values. Second, utility is higher for the higher curve than for the 
lower one, so that raising the cost of 𝑞𝑧 increases utility. 
In Rosen’s (1974) original study, each consumer selects only one unit of one good 𝐳, and the bid 
function depends upon which 𝐳 is chosen. Rosen imposes sufficient conditions to guarantee that this 
function is smooth and convex in each attribute 𝑧𝑘. Similar bid-attribute curves could be drawn in the 
current setting if 𝑞𝑧 is restricted to equal one for a single good 𝐳 and zero for all other goods. In that case, 
the four panels of Figure 4 could be redrawn with 𝑧𝑘 rather than 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) along the horizontal axis. In 
Rosen’s framework, only panel A is a valid bid-attribute relationship, and the slope of the bid-attribute 
relationship must have the same sign for every consumer. Using the current model, panels A and C are 
both valid, and the relationship may vary in arbitrary ways across consumers.17
 
 Allowing for such 
complex functional forms helps to accommodate product attributes such as sweetness, brightness, and 
number of garages, that are only desirable in small doses and others, such as proximity to specific friends 
and family, that only matter to certain consumers. 
                                                          
17 For BLP (1995), who assume linear utility, the only valid bid-attribute relationships would be straight lines. 
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Figure 4: Examples of Valid and Invalid Bid-Quantity Relationships 


































Notes to Figure 4: Each graph shows hypothetical plots of 𝜃𝑖(𝑞𝑧,𝑝𝑥 ,𝑤,𝑢) against 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) for different utility levels. In all cases, 𝑢1 < 𝑢2.
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C. Treatment Technology and Marginal Willingness to Pay 
The MWTP by consumer 𝑖 for attribute 𝑧𝑘 is defined in terms of a treatment technology. The 
treatment technology is defined as follows: 
TREATMENT TECHNOLOGY. A treatment technology for attribute 𝑧𝑘 and set 𝐙𝐓 is a function 
𝑇𝐙𝐓𝑘:ℳ𝑍[0,+] →ℳ𝑍[0,+] that satisfies 𝑞𝑧′ = 𝑇𝐙𝐓𝑘(𝑞𝑧) ⇔ 𝑞𝑧′(𝐳) = 𝑞𝑧(𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑘 − 1, … , 𝑧𝑛) for all 
𝐳 ∈ 𝐙𝐓 and 𝑞𝑧′(𝐳) = 𝑞𝑧(𝐳) for all 𝐳 ∉ 𝐙𝐓. 
 
Hence, 𝑇𝐙𝐓𝑘 converts any bundle 𝑞𝑧 of goods in 𝐙 into a new bundle 𝑇𝐙𝐓𝑘(𝑞𝑧) of goods in 𝐙 in which 
every unit of every good in 𝐙𝐓 is replaced with the equivalent good with an additional unit of 𝑧𝑘. This 
treatment technology effectively increases 𝑧𝑘 by one unit for every 𝐳 in 𝐙𝐓 that 𝑖 choses to consume. 
Applying the treatment technology to a positive mass 𝐙𝐓 of goods for a positive mass of consumers could 
in principle generate changes in the attributes of other goods or in the prices of goods in 𝐙 or 𝐗. For the 
purposes of defining MWTP, we consider an application of the treatment technology holding these factors 
constant. 
Knowing that the treatment technology will be applied to one’s bundle of goods alters a 
consumer’s optimal choices. Under the regime in which a treatment technology for attribute 𝑧𝑘 will be 
applied to 𝑖’s goods in the set 𝐙𝐓, holding prices constant, 𝑖 solves the following problem: 
(1) max𝑞𝑥𝑖,𝑞𝑧𝑖 𝑢𝑖 �𝑞𝑥𝑖,𝑇𝐙𝐓𝑘(𝑞𝑧𝑖)� subject to 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑞𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝𝑧 ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖 ≤ 𝑤𝑖. 
Let (𝑞𝑥𝑖∗ , 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ ) continue to denote 𝑖’s optimal consumption bundle at equilibrium prices in the absence of 
any intervention. Let �𝑞𝑥𝑖𝑘 , 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 � denote the consumption bundle that 𝑖 would choose to purchase at 
equilibrium prices, given the knowledge that the bundle of goods 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘  will be converted into 𝑇𝐙𝑘�𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 �, 
where the treatment is applied to the entire set 𝐙. If, for example, 𝑧𝑘 is local school quality, then 𝑖 might 
select a home in a relatively low quality school district with the understanding that the district will be 
improved by the treatment technology. The bundle 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘  includes the home in the low quality district, and 
𝑇𝐙𝑘�𝑞𝑧𝑖
𝑘 � represents the same bundle after the school quality improvement. 
 Given this technology, we define the benefit to 𝑖 of a one-unit increase in attribute 𝑧𝑘: 
MARGINAL WILLINGNESS TO PAY. Consumer 𝑖’s Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP) for 
𝑧𝑘  is scalar-valued, is denoted 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘𝑖, and equals 𝜃𝑖�𝑇𝐙𝑘�𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 �, 𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑤𝑖∗,𝑢𝑖∗� − 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 . 
 
𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘𝑖 is a dollar-denominated measure of the consumer surplus that 𝑖 experiences due to the treatment 
technology, i.e., from consuming 𝑇𝐙𝑘�𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 � at the price 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 . Because consumer surplus is defined 
relative to the benchmark utility level 𝑢𝑖∗, this formula gives the change in surplus that 𝑖 would experience 




In order for 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘𝑖 to accurately measure this benefit, it is essential that the final term, 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 , 
be subtracted off, so that the expression returns a surplus and not a reservation price. If 𝑖 lives in a school 
district with high housing prices and 𝑧𝑘 is school district quality, being offered the treatment technology 
could induce 𝑖 to move to a more affordable area. After applying the treatment technology, the new area 
could be as desirable as or even less desirable than the old one. However, the treatment technology had a 
positive benefit by helping 𝑖 to save money. This savings is taken into account by subtracting the price 
difference, 𝑝𝑧∗ ∙ �𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 − 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ �, which is negative in this case, from the difference in reservation prices. 
In Rosen’s (1974) original study, the MWTP is the derivative of 𝜃𝑖 with respect to 𝑧𝑘 for the one 
good in in 𝐙 that 𝑖 consumes. Because the market is “thick” with every possible good in 𝐙, each consumer 
selects an interior solution for each attribute, and the MWTP for 𝑧𝑘 is exactly equal to the marginal cost 
to producers of adding an additional unit of 𝑧𝑘 to a good. In that framework, all owners of Ford Mustangs 
place the same value on additional units of safety, horsepower, and fuel efficiency. In the current setting, 
prices are not necessarily continuous functions of product attributes, markets are thin, and two buyers of 
Ford Mustangs may have very different utility functions. Each might select a Mustang with factory 
specifications because it is one of the few products available at a particularly reasonable price. 
Because we use a flexible functional form for 𝑢𝑖 and because markets may be thin, 𝑖’s 
consumption bundles will not necessarily represent interior solutions. Consequently, it is more natural to 
consider discrete changes in attributes (as achieved through the treatment technology) than to differentiate 
the bid function. The discrete change of the treatment technology is also better than marginal changes are 
at reflecting the type of variation that is generated through experiments and quasi-experiments. Because it 
is possible to consume more than one 𝐳 in the current model, it is necessary in the definition of MWTP to 
specify which goods receive the additional unit of 𝑧𝑘. The definition of MWTP used here supposes that 
the treatment technology is applied to all goods in 𝐙 that 𝑖 consumes.  
 
D. Heterogeneity in MWTP 
 The variation across consumers in MWTP can be modeled in terms of a distribution: 
MWTP DENSITY. Let the MWTP density for attribute 𝑧𝑘 be denoted 𝑓𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃:ℝ → ℝ[0,+] and 
represent the population density function (pdf) of 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘𝑖 across consumers. Let 𝐹𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃:ℝ →[0,1] denote the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of 𝑓𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃. 
 
The MWTP density for attribute 𝑧𝑘 describes the variation across consumers in their excess valuations of 
𝑇𝑘�𝑞𝑧𝑖
𝑘 ,𝐙�, their optimal bundles of goods in 𝐙 in the case in which the treatment technology for 𝑧𝑘 is 
applied to every good in 𝐙. 
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 A primary goal of this study is to establish conditions for identifying the MWTP density. In many 
cases, ethical or cost considerations will prevent researchers from conducting experiments to accomplish 
this goal. To address those cases, experiments and quasi-experiments are considered that estimate 
alternative measures of attribute demand that are similar to MWTP. 
 
E. Aggregate Demand and Marginal Surplus 
Many recent hedonic studies examine the effects of shocks that increase the levels of some 
product attributes for entire communities. Chay and Greenstone (2005), for example, measure the effects 
of county-wide air pollution reductions on housing prices. When evaluating quasi-experiments of this 
form, it is useful to have a definition of the aggregate benefits of a large scale shock. Let 𝐚 ⊆ 𝐈 be a subset 
of consumers, and let 𝐙𝐓 ⊂ 𝐙 be a subset of goods in 𝐙. Let 𝜏 be a tax that any consumer in 𝐚 must pay 
per unit of goods consumed in 𝐙𝐓. Our definition of aggregate benefits depends upon the aggregate 
demand function: 
AGGREGATE DEMAND FUNCTION. The aggregate demand function for 𝐙𝐓 among 
consumers in 𝐚 is denoted 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚:ℝ × ℳ𝑠 → ℝ[0,+]. For every 𝑖 in 𝐚, let 𝑞𝑧𝑖′  be the bundle of goods 
in 𝐙 that is derived from solving the following problem: max𝑞𝑥𝑖′ ,𝑞𝑧𝑖′ �𝑢𝑖(𝑞𝑥𝑖′ , 𝑞𝑧𝑖′ ) + 𝜆𝑖 ∗
�𝑤𝑖 − 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑞𝑥𝑖
′ − 𝑝𝑧 ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖
′ − 𝜏 ∗ ∫ 1𝑑𝐳𝐙𝑻 ��. The quantity 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚(𝜏, 𝑠) is defined as 
∫ ∫ 𝑞𝑧𝑖
′ (𝐳)𝐙𝐓𝐚 𝑑𝐳𝑑𝑖. 
 
This function measures the total quantity of goods in 𝐙𝐓 demanded by consumers in 𝐚. It depends on the 
tax on goods in 𝐙𝐓 and the state of the economy 𝑠. Because this function describes the demand multiple 
goods together, there is not a single “own price” of goods in 𝐙𝐓. The tax 𝜏 is introduced into the 
aggregate demand function to approximate an own price effect, because a change in 𝜏 has equal effects 
on the purchase prices for all goods in 𝐙𝐓. For simplicity, suppose that, in the absence of any intervention, 
𝜏 is zero. In addition to measuring totals across consumers, the aggregate demand function can apply to 
an individual consumer 𝑖, where 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝑖(𝜏, 𝑠), denotes the total quantity of goods in 𝐙𝐓 that would be 
consumed by 𝑖 given a tax 𝜏 and state of the economy 𝑠. This function can also apply to a single good 𝐳, 
where 𝑄𝐳𝐚(𝜏, 𝑠) refers to the total quantity of the good 𝐳 demanded by consumers in 𝐚. 
Product quantities vary continuously, and aggregate demand is a twice continuously differentiable 
and bijective function of 𝜏 for any set of goods 𝐙𝐓 ⊆ 𝐙 and any consumers 𝐚 ⊆ 𝐈. Given this bijective 
property, we can define the inverse of aggregate demand: 
INVERSE AGGREGATE DEMAND. The inverse aggregate demand function for 𝐙𝐓 among 
consumers in 𝐚 is denoted 𝜏𝐙𝐓𝐚:ℝ[0,+] × ℳ𝑠 → ℝ. This function 𝜏𝐙𝐓𝐚(𝑄, 𝑠) is defined as the 




At a given aggregate quantity level 𝑄 and state of the economy 𝑠 the inverse aggregate demand function 
gives the positive or negative tax that would be required to make aggregate demand for 𝐙𝐓 among 
consumers in 𝐚 exactly equal to 𝑄. This tax can be interpreted as the surplus obtained from the 𝑄𝑡ℎ unit of 
𝐙𝐓 demanded by consumers in 𝐚. 
 Next, consider an exogenous one-unit increase in 𝑧𝑘 for all goods in 𝐙𝐓, holding all prices 
constant. An example of such a shock could be a regulation that improves air quality in a neighborhood or 
one that requires certain automobiles to have air bags. 
AGGREGATE TREATED DEMAND. The aggregate 𝑧𝑘-treated demand function for 𝐙𝐓 among 
consumers in 𝐚 is denoted 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘  :ℝ × ℳ𝑠 → ℝ[0,+]. For every 𝑖 in 𝐚, let 𝑞𝑧𝑖′  denote the bundle of 
goods in 𝐙 that is derived from solving the following problem: max𝑞𝑥𝑖′ ,𝑞𝑧𝑖′ �𝑢𝑖 �𝑞𝑥𝑖′ ,𝑇𝐙𝐓𝑘(𝑞𝑧𝑖′ )� +
𝜆𝑖 ∗ �𝑤𝑖 − 𝑝𝑥 ∙ 𝑞𝑥𝑖
′ − 𝑝𝑧 ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖
′ − 𝜏 ∗ ∫ 1𝑑𝐳𝐙𝑻 ��. The quantity 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚𝑘 (𝜏, 𝑠) is defined as 
∫ ∫ 𝑞𝑧𝑖
′ (𝐳)𝐙𝐓𝐚 𝑑𝐳𝑑𝑖. 
 
INVERSE AGGREGATE TREATED DEMAND. The inverse aggregate 𝑧𝑘-treated demand 
function for 𝐙𝐓 among consumers in 𝐚 is denoted 𝜏𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘  :ℝ[0,+] × ℳ𝑠 → ℝ. This function 
𝜏𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠) is defined as the value of 𝜏 that satisifies 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚𝑘 (𝜏, 𝑠) = 𝑄. 
 
The aggregate 𝑧𝑘-treated demand function measures the total quantity ∫ ∫ 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳)𝐙𝐓𝐚 𝑑𝐳𝑑𝑖 of goods in 𝐙𝐓 
that would be demanded by consumers in 𝐚 if consumers knew beforehand that the treatment technology 
for 𝑧𝑘 would be applied to all goods purchased in 𝐙𝐓. 
The aggregate benefits of the one-unit increase in 𝑧𝑘 to all goods in 𝐙𝐓 can be expressed in terms 
of the inverse aggregate treated demand and the inverse aggregate demand. This benefit measure is called 
the Marginal Surplus (MS): 
MARGINAL SURPLUS: The MS among consumers in 𝐚 for a 𝑧𝑘-treatment to goods in 𝐙𝐓 is 
denoted 𝑀𝑆𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘 :ℝ[0,+] × ℳ𝑠 → ℝ. This function 𝑀𝑆𝐙𝐓𝐚𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠) is defined as 𝜏𝐙𝐓𝐚𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠) −
𝜏𝐙𝐓𝐚(𝑄, 𝑠). 
 
For each quantity level 𝑄, 𝑀𝑆𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘  measures the surplus generated by treating the 𝑄𝑡ℎ unit of goods in 𝐙𝐓 
that is demanded by consumers in 𝐚. 
Figure 5 plots the two terms in 𝑀𝑆𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘  as functions of 𝑄. The higher and lower curves depict 
aggregate demand under the regimes of treatment and no treatment, respectively. At each 𝑄 level, the 
𝑀𝑆𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘  is the vertical difference between the two curves. While both curves express willingness to pay 
among consumers in 𝐚, the identity of the buyer purchasing the 𝑄th unit may change with the application 





Figure 5: Aggregate Demand for Treated and 













Notes to Figure 5: The lower curve illustrates the inverse aggregate demand for products in 𝐙𝐓 among 
consumers in 𝐚 as a function of the quantity. At each value 𝑄, this curve returns the surplus obtained from 
the 𝑄𝑡ℎ unit consumed. The higher curve illustrates the same inverse aggregate demand after each product 
in 𝐙𝐓 has been “treated” with a one-unit increase in 𝑧𝑘. The difference in the two curves measures the 
effect of the treatment on the surplus obtained from the 𝑄𝑡ℎ unit consumed. In addition to 𝑄, MS and the 
inverse aggregate demand functions depend on 𝑠, which summarizes the state of the economy. MS is 
different from MWTP because the consumer of the 𝑄𝑡ℎ unit in the untreated state may be a different 
person from the one who consumes the 𝑄𝑡ℎ unit in the treated state. 
 
V. IDENTIFICATION OF MWTP DENSITIES 
A. An Idealized Experiment 
 We begin our discussion of identification with an idealized experiment that will be feasible when 
the researcher can apply the treatment technology and charge randomly assigned prices for that 
technology to different consumers:  
IDEALIZED EXPERIMENT. To conduct the idealized experiment, the researcher draws a 
sample of 𝑁 consumers from the population, where the draws are independent. Each consumer 
has the option to have the treatment technology for attribute 𝑧𝑘 applied to every good consumed 
from 𝐙. To receive this treatment, the consumer must pay a treatment price 𝜏𝑖, where 𝜏𝑖 is 
Surplus 
𝑀𝑆𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠) 
Aggregate surplus for the 𝑄th product in 𝐙𝐓 if no 
treatment were applied, 𝜏𝐙𝐓𝐚(𝑄, 𝑠) 
𝑄 
Aggregate consumption of products in 𝐙𝐓 among agents in 𝐚 
 
𝜏𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠) Aggregate surplus for the 𝑄th treated product,  
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randomly assigned across consumers. The treatment price 𝜏𝑖 has a compact support �𝜏, 𝜏�. 𝐹𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃 
is bounded away from zero and one over this support. 
 
The idealized experiment can be applied to measure the MWTP for home improvements, product 
upgrades, and attributes that are artificially tied to specific houses or jobs, as with school district access or 
health care coverage. 
 In the absence of the treatment, 𝑖 selects the bundle 𝑞𝑧𝑖∗  of goods in 𝐙 and obtains zero surplus. If 
the treatment is provided at a price 𝜏𝑖 = 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑘𝑖, then 𝑖 is able to purchase the bundle 𝑇𝐙𝑘�𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 � at a cost 
of 𝜃𝑖�𝑇𝐙𝑘�𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 �, 𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑤𝑖∗,𝑢𝑖∗�. By the definition of the bid function and consumer surplus, 𝑖 receives utility 
of 𝑢𝑖∗ and zero consumer surplus at this treatment price. At the treatment price 𝜏𝑖 = 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑘𝑖, consumer 𝑖 
is therefore indifferent between selecting and not selecting the treatment. Local non-satiation implies that, 
at any treatment price greater than 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑘𝑖, purchasing the treatment would give 𝑖 negative surplus, and 
at any treatment price less than 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑘𝑖, purchasing the treatment would give 𝑖 positive surplus. 
 Identification of 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘𝑖 in the idealized experiment is a straightforward application of a 
standard nonparametric discrete choice estimator (cf., Pagan and Ullah, 1999, pp. 272-99).  Consumer 𝑖 
selects the treatment option if and only if 𝜏𝑖 ≤ 𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑘𝑖. At a given treatment price 𝜏, the fraction of 
consumers who select the treatment option is 𝑃𝑟𝑖(𝑀𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑘𝑖 ≥ 𝜏), where the probability is taken over all 
consumers 𝑖. This probability can be rewritten as 1 − 𝐹𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝜏). Let 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 be a dummy for whether 𝑖 
selects the treatment. Let ℤ+ denote the set of positive integers. A consistent kernel estimator for 
𝐹𝑘
𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝜏) can be constructed following Li and Racine (2007, pp. 182-3, 209-10; 2008):18
BANDWIDTH AND WEIGHTING KERNEL: A bandwidth ℎ:ℤ+ → ℝ+ is defined as a 
decreasing function of the sample size 𝑁. For simplicity, let the value ℎ(𝑁) be denoted ℎ. This 
function satisfies the conditions that lim𝑁→∞ ℎ = 0 and lim𝑁→∞ 𝑁 ∗ ℎ = ∞. A weighting kernel 
𝜔:ℝ → ℝ[0,+] is a symmetric, bounded pdf that integrates to one. 
 
 
ESTIMATOR IN IDEALIZED EXPERIMENT: Given a sample size 𝑁, bandwidth ℎ, and 











Formulas for the estimators are presented here; proofs of consistency and formulas for the bias, variance, 
and asymptotic distributions appear in the appendix. 
 
B. Studies of Existing Tradeoffs 
                                                          
18 This estimator is similar to that used in a variety of discrete choice settings including contingent valuation 
experiments in which survey participants report how they might act if presented with certain hypothetical tradeoffs 
(Creel and Loomis, 1997; Crooker and Herriges, 2004; Kristrom, 1990). 
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 In some cases, it is possible to learn about consumers’ valuations of an important attribute or 
public good by examining decisions that specific consumers already face: 
EXISTING TRADEOFF EXPERIMENT: Let 𝐙𝟎,𝐙𝑘 ⊆ 𝐙 be two sets of goods that satisfy 
𝐳 ∈ 𝐙𝟎 ⇔ 𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑘 + 1, … , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝐙𝑘, so that 𝐙𝑘 contains the treated variant of every good in 𝐙𝟎. 
A sample of 𝑁 consumers is drawn from a population 𝐚 ⊆ 𝐈 of consumers. The consumers in 𝐚 all 
have utility functions such that their optimal bundles in 𝐙 either include only goods in 𝐙𝟎 or only 
goods in 𝐙𝑘. Hence, for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐚, at every value of 𝜏, 𝑄𝐙𝟎𝑖(𝜏, 𝑠∗) = 𝑄𝐙𝑖(𝜏, 𝑠∗) or 𝑄𝐙𝑘𝑖(𝜏, 𝑠∗) =
𝑄𝐙𝑖(𝜏, 𝑠∗). For each consumer in the sample, prices between the two sets differ by a consumer-
specific constant treatment price 𝜏𝑖, so that 𝑝𝑧(𝐳) = 𝑝𝑧(𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑘 + 1, … , 𝑧𝑛) − 𝜏𝑖 for each 𝐳 ∈
𝐙𝟎. There is random or quasi-random variation across consumers in 𝜏𝑖. The treatment price 𝜏𝑖 has 
a compact support �𝜏, 𝜏�. 𝐹𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃 is bounded away from zero and one over this support. 
 
In the existing tradeoff experiment, the researcher first identifies a population of consumers who face an 
important binary decision. This decision is modeled as a choice between selecting one’s goods in 𝐙 
entirely from the set 𝐙𝟎 or entirely from the treated variant 𝐙𝑘. The researcher selects a random sample of 
consumers already making this decision and randomly assigns taxes or subsidies for selecting the treated 
option. 
 Our estimator in the existing tradeoff setting is identical to the estimator used in the idealized 
experiment. The distribution of MWTP is estimated with a nonparametric kernel regression of 1 − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 
on 𝜏𝑖. The existing tradeoff estimator identifies 𝐹𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝜏| 𝑖 ∈ 𝐚) over the support of 𝜏 and consequently 
generates internally valid estimates of the distribution of MWTP for the subpopulation 𝐚. The degree to 
which these estimates generalize to the overall population depends on the degree to which 𝐚 is a 
representative subset of 𝐈. If decisions are only observed at one treatment price 𝜏, 𝐹𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝜏| 𝑖 ∈ 𝐚) can 
be estimated at the MWTP value 𝜏. If the treatment price is assigned according to a discrete probability 
distribution, then 𝐹𝑘𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝜏| 𝑖 ∈ 𝐚) can be estimated at the different 𝜏 values assigned in the experiment. 
In one example of an existing tradeoff experiment, Duflo, et al. (2006), consider a population of 
consumers who must decide whether to invest their tax returns into individual retirement accounts or take 
them as cash. The authors randomly assign a subsidy for selecting the retirement account, so that the 
time-deferred asset is subsidized for some consumers and not for others. In a quasi-experimental example, 
Warner and Pleeter (2001) study the U.S. military’s drawdown of personnel in the 1990s. Employees 
leaving the military could select one of two compensation packages. The first was a lump sum payment, 
and the second was an annuity. The generosity of the annuity relative to the lump sum payment varied 
across employees according to a nonlinear function of rank and seniority. In both of these experiments, 
the set 𝐙𝟎 consists of cash today, and the set 𝐙𝑘 consists of cash in the future. Measuring the value of the 
time-deferred asset relative to cash today provides estimates of the discount rates for these consumers. 
In another example, Abrams and Rohlfs (2011) examine criminal defendants who are deciding 
whether to post bail or to remain in jail until trial. The market of interest 𝐙 is one’s activities over the 90 
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days until one’s trial. Defendants who select the set (and do not post bail) 𝐙𝟎 must remain in jail, so that 
they have relatively little freedom over those 90 days, and defendants who select 𝐙𝑘 and post bail are 
allowed to be free from jail over those 90 days. The authors focus on an experiment conducted in 1981 in 
Philadelphia that generated random variation across defendants in the bail levels that they faced. This 
exogenous variation in bail makes it possible to measure the value that defendants placed on 90 days of 
freedom from jail. 
An example of a quasi-random discrete probability distribution for the price of treatment appears 
in a study by Rohlfs, Sullivan, and Kniesner (2013) of consumer valuations of automobile air bags. In that 
case, the market of interest is new and used vehicles, 𝐙𝟎 includes vehicles without air bags, and 𝐙𝑘 
includes the same vehicles with air bags. Due to government regulations, the supply of air bags increased 
dramatically over a short period, so that in the early periods of the data, the premium on an air bag 
reflected the valuation of an air bag for someone at the high end of the MWTP distribution. As the air 
bags became steadily more common, the premium on an air bag reflected the valuation of an air bag for a 
consumer at the median, and later at the low end of the MWTP distribution, so that the shifts trace out the 
shape of the MWTP distribution. 
 
C. Offer-Restricted Environments 
 A related strategy to the existing tradeoffs approach is to induce consumers to participate in an 
experiment that restricts their choices: 
OFFER-RESTRICTED EXPERIMENT: A sample of 𝑁 consumers is drawn from the population, 
and each one is offered a large dollar payment 𝛿 to participate in the experiment. Each participant 
must select bundles in 𝐙 that either include only goods in 𝐙𝟎 or only goods in 𝐙𝑘. Hence, for each 
𝑖, participation in the experiment requires that 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) = 0 for every 𝐳 ∉ 𝐙𝟎 or 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) = 0 for 
every 𝐳 ∉ 𝐙𝑘. The payment 𝛿 is sufficiently large that every consumer opts to participate. Each 
participant may choose between consuming goods in 𝐙𝟎 or goods in 𝐙𝑘. The researcher randomly 
assigns a treatment price 𝜏𝑖 across participants in the experiment. Let the price schedule in the 
offer-restricted experiment be denoted �𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑝𝑧𝐙𝐓�, where 𝑝𝑧𝐙𝐓(𝐳) = 𝑝𝑧∗(𝐳) for all 𝐳 ∈ 𝐙0 and 
𝑝𝑧
𝐙𝐓(𝐳) = 𝑝𝑧∗(𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑘 − 1, … , 𝑧𝑛) + 𝜏𝑖 for all 𝐳 ∈ 𝐙𝑘. The treatment price 𝜏𝑖 has a compact 
support �𝜏, 𝜏�. The fraction selecting the treated option is bounded away from zero and one over 
this support. 
 
OFFER-RESTRICTED CONSUMPTION BUNDLE: For a set of goods 𝐙𝐓 ⊆ 𝐙 and a dollar 
payment 𝛿, consumer 𝑖’s offer-restricted consumption bundle for a set 𝐙𝐓 and payment 𝛿 is 𝑖’s 
optimal consumption bundle �𝑞𝑥𝑖
𝐙𝐓 ,𝑞𝑧𝑖𝐙𝐓� given the restriction that 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝐙𝐓(𝐳) = 0 for all 𝐳 ∉ 𝐙𝐓 and 
supposing that 𝑖 is given a dollar payment 𝛿. Analytically, this consumption bundle is the solution 
to the following optimization problem: max𝑞𝑥𝑖,𝑞𝑧𝑖 𝑢𝑖 (𝑞𝑥𝑖,𝑞𝑧𝑖) subject to 𝑝𝑥∗ ∙ 𝑞𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝𝑧𝐙𝐓 ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖 ≤
𝑤𝑖 + 𝛿 and 𝑞𝑧𝑖(𝐳) = 0 for all 𝐳 ∉ 𝐙𝐓. 
 
OFFER-RESTRICTED MWTP: Let 𝐙𝟎,𝐙𝑘 ⊆ 𝐙 be two sets of goods that satisfy 𝐳 ∈ 𝐙𝟎 ⇔
𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑘 + 1, … , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝐙𝑘, so that 𝐙𝑘 contains the treated variant of every good in 𝐙𝟎. Let 𝛿 de a 
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dollar payment offered to 𝑖. Consumer 𝑖’s offer-restricted MWTP for 𝑧𝑘 from goods in 𝐙𝟎 with 
payment 𝛿  is scalar-valued and equals 𝜃𝑖 �𝑞𝑧𝑖𝐙𝑘 ,𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑤𝑖∗ + 𝛿,𝑢𝑖�𝑞𝑥𝑖𝐙𝟎 ,𝑞𝑧𝑖𝐙𝟎�� − 𝑝𝑧𝐙𝐓 ∙ 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝐙𝑘. The pdf 
𝑓𝑘
𝐙𝟎:ℝ → ℝ[0,+] denotes the density of the offer-restricted MWTP, and the corresponding CDF is 
written as 𝐹𝑘
𝐙𝟎𝛿:ℝ → [0,1]. 
 
In the offer-restricted experiment, consumers are invited to join the study and to restrict their choices in 𝐙 
to come either entirely from 𝐙𝟎 or entirely from 𝐙𝑘. In exchange for accepting this restriction, participants 
are given a payment 𝛿. As with the idealized and existing tradeoff experiments, there is a treatment price 
𝜏𝑖 that is randomly assigned across consumers, and consumers must pay this price in order to consume 
goods from 𝐙𝑘. Because consumers are paid to participate in the experiment, the offer-restricted MWTP 
is defined using 𝑢𝑖�𝑞𝑥𝑖
𝐙𝟎 , 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝐙𝟎� rather than 𝑢𝑖(𝑞𝑥𝑖∗ ,𝑞𝑧𝑖∗ ) as the benchmark utility level. 
The estimation strategy in the offer-restricted experiment is the same as in the idealized and 
existing tradeoff experiments. A nonparametric kernel regression of 1 − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 on 𝜏𝑖 identifies the CDF 
of the offer-restricted MWTP over the support �𝜏, 𝜏�. Oftentimes, the researcher will not be able to offer a 
sufficiently high payment 𝛿 to induce every consumer to participate in the study. In such cases, the study 
will produce internally valid estimates of 𝐹𝑘
𝐙𝟎 for a selected sample of consumers who are particularly 
receptive to cash incentives or to the chance to receive the treatment. 
 One important example of an offer-restricted experiment is the Rand Health Insurance 
Experiment (Manning, et al., 1987). The researchers randomly assigned health insurance plans across 
participants, so that some consumers faced high prices for doctor and hospital visits and others faced low 
prices. The authors use this random variation in prices to estimate the willingness to pay for doctor visits 
and other types of medical care. Another example of an offer-restricted experiment is the Internet 
Demand Experiment (Edell, and Variaya, 1999; Varian, 2001). Consumers participating in that study 
agreed to have their internet service provided by the researchers. Every time consumers went online, they 
faced a menu of different amounts of bandwidth, each sold at a different price. These prices for 
bandwidth were randomly assigned across consumers. A third example of offer-restricted experiments 
involves laboratory or field experiments to measure the discount rate (e.g., Harrison, Lau, and Williams, 
2002; McClure, et al., 2004). In such studies, consumers are offered a cash amount to be paid now or a 
slightly larger amount to be distributed later (e.g., $100 now or $100 plus some additional amount in 
seven months). The additional amount that is offered later is randomly assigned across consumers. 
 
VI. IDENTIFICATION OF AGGREGATE DEMAND FOR ATTRIBUTES 
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 In many cases, no specific consumer faces a choice between treated and untreated sets of goods, 
but researchers can learn about the demand for treatment by measuring the extent to which it affects total 
sales of the product of interest. Such estimators can be used to identify MS. 
 
A. Randomized Product Offers 
 One approach for estimating MS is to generate randomized product offers whose characteristics 
vary continuously across the consumers being studied: 
OFFER DENSITIES. Let the offer density functions 𝑔0:𝐙 → ℝ[0,+] and 𝑔𝑘:𝐙 → ℝ[0,+] both be 
pdfs that assign density levels to each good in 𝐙. These density functions are constructed to 
satisfy 𝑔0(𝐳) = 𝑔𝑘(𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑘 + 1, … , 𝑧𝑛) for all 𝐳, so that goods drawn from 𝑔𝑘 have on average 
one more unit of 𝑧𝑘 than do those drawn from 𝑔0. 
 
RANDOMIZED OFFER EXPERIMENT. A sample of 𝑁 consumers is drawn from the 
population, where 𝑁 is even. For the first 𝑁 2⁄  consumers, a good 𝐳𝑖 is randomly selected for 
each consumer from the distribution 𝑔0; for the remaining 𝑁 2⁄ , 𝐳𝑖 is selected according to 𝑔𝑘. 
Each consumer is offered a subsidy of 𝛿 per unit consumed of the offered good, where 𝛿 is 
constant across consumers. Additionally, the researcher randomly assigns a per unit tax 𝜏𝑖 across 
participants in the experiment, where 𝜏𝑖 has a compact support �𝜏, 𝜏� with 𝜏 < 𝛿. Each good 𝐳𝑖 is 
offered at a subsidized price of 𝑝𝑧∗(𝐳𝑖) − 𝛿 + 𝜏𝑖. The fraction of consumers who select zero units 
of the offered good is bounded away from one over �𝜏, 𝜏� and 𝐙. 
 
In the randomized offer experiment, each consumer in the sample is offered a different good. In addition 
to randomly selecting the product offers, subsidies for the offered goods are randomly assigned across 
consumers. 
Let ℎ be a bandwidth and 𝜔 be a symmetric weighting kernel. Our parameter of interest and our 
estimator are defined as follows: 
MS FOR THE AVERAGE OFFERED GOOD. The marginal surplus (MS) for the average 
offered good at quantity level 𝑄 is denoted 𝐸𝐙�𝑀𝑆𝒛𝐈𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠∗)� and equals ∫ 𝑀𝑆𝒛𝐈𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠∗)𝐙 𝑔0(𝐳)𝑑𝐳. 
 
RANDOMIZED OFFER ESTIMATOR. For any level of 𝑄 for which ∫ 𝜏𝐳𝑖𝐈(𝑄, 𝑠∗)𝑔0(𝐳)𝑑𝐳𝐙  and 
∫ 𝜏𝐳𝑖𝐈
𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠∗)𝑔0(𝐳)𝑑𝐳𝐙  both fall within the interval �𝜏 − 𝛿, 𝜏 − 𝛿�, the estimator 𝐸�𝐙�𝑀𝑆𝒛𝐈𝑘 (𝑄, 𝑠∗)� 
of MS for the average offered good at quantity level 𝑄 equals argmin𝜏 �𝑄 − ∑ 𝜔�𝜏𝑖−𝜏ℎ �∗𝑄𝐳𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝑖−𝛿,𝑠∗)𝑁𝑖=𝑁 2⁄ +1∑ 𝜔�𝜏𝑖−𝜏
ℎ
�𝑁𝑖=𝑁 2⁄ +1








The first argmin term in our random offer estimator estimates the 𝜏 value at which consumption of the 
offered good would equal 𝑄 for the average good selected according to the 𝑔𝑘 pdf. This argmin measures 
the inverse aggregate treated demand at quantity 𝑄. The second argmin term estimates the 𝜏 value at 
which consumption of the offered good would equal 𝑄 for the average good selected according to the 𝑔0 
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pdf. This argmin measures the inverse aggregate (untreated) demand at quantity 𝑄. To estimate these 
argmins, the researcher first estimates two separate nonparametric kernel regressions of 𝑄𝐳𝑖𝑖(𝜏𝑖 − 𝛿, 𝑠∗) 
on 𝜏𝑖, one for each of the two halves of the sample. Next, the researcher inverts these functions by 
conducting a grid search of 𝜏 values or using Newton’s method. The third term measures the average 
price difference between the offered goods in the two samples. In the definition of MS, the treatment 
technology is applied holding prices constant. In this experiment, the prices are different for the average 
“treated” good drawn from the 𝑔𝑘 pdf and the average “untreated” good drawn from the 𝑔0 pdf. The third 
term in the formula for the estimator corrects for this price difference. 
 In one recent application of a randomized offer experiment, Bertrand, et al. (2010) offered 
subsidized loans to small business owners in South Africa. The researchers randomized multiple features 
of the loan, including response deadlines, advertising content, and interest rates. Other researchers have 
implemented randomized offer experiments to study the supply of charitable contributions (Karlan and 
List, 2007; Landry, et al., 2006). In those studies, subjects were approached and solicited for donations; 
the researchers randomized the physical characteristics of the solicitors and the extent to which the charity 
offered matching contributions or lottery incentives. 
 
B. Take-up Rate Studies 
 One common experimental strategy for measuring attribute demands is to examine total sales for 
matched pairs of products that are similar in all but one attribute. Using such an approach to estimate MS 
involves conducting two experiments: 
TAKE-UP EXPERIMENT: Let 𝐙𝟎,𝐙𝑘 ⊆ 𝐙 be two sets of goods that satisfy 𝐳 ∈ 𝐙𝟎 ⇔
𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑘 + 1, … , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝐙𝑘, so that 𝐙𝑘 contains the treated variant of every good in 𝐙𝟎. In a take-up 
experiment, 𝑁𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑢𝑝 consumers are selected from the population. The first  𝑁𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑢𝑝 2⁄  
consumers are offered a subsidy of 𝛿 per unit of goods consumed from 𝐙𝟎. The second 
𝑁𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑢𝑝 2⁄  of consumers are offered a subsidy of 𝛿 per unit of goods consumed from 𝐙𝑘. 
Selection into the first or second half of the sample is randomized. Let 𝑠∗ denote the state of the 
economy in the take-up experiment. 
 
PRICE EXPERIMENT: In the price experiment, 𝑁𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 consumers are selected. Each consumer 
is charged a tax 𝜏𝑖, which could be positive or negative, per unit of goods consumed from the set 
𝐙𝜏 ⊆ 𝐙. The tax 𝜏𝑖 has a compact support �𝜏, 𝜏�, and the fraction of consumers who purchase zero 
units of goods from 𝐙𝜏 is bounded away from one over this support. Let 𝑠𝜏 denote the state of the 
economy in the price experiment. 
 
There are many different types of studies that have the general structure of the take-up experiment, and 
take-up experiments are often easier and less costly to implement than the idealized, existing tradeoff, and 
offer-restricted experiments are. 
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This relative ease of implementation comes at a cost, however. Importantly, it is not possible 
using the take-up experiment to measure the MWTP for any consumers, and we instead focus on 
estimating marginal surplus for the marginal unit: 
MARGINAL SURPLUS FOR THE MARGINAL UNIT. For a set 𝐙𝐓 of goods in 𝐙, a set 𝐚 of 
consumers, a subsidy of 𝛿 per unit of goods consumed in 𝐙𝐓, and a state of the economy 𝑠, 
marginal surplus for 𝑧𝑘 for the marginal unit is defined as 𝑀𝑆𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘 �𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚(−𝛿, 𝑠), 𝑠�. 
 
The marginal surplus for the marginal unit is the vertical difference in aggregate demand between 𝐙𝐓 and 
its treated variant, evaluated at the quantity level 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚(−𝛿, 𝑠) that would be consumed in the absence of 
the treatment, supposing that all consumers in 𝐚 were given a subsidy of 𝛿 per unit purchased of goods in 
𝐙𝐓. This surplus can be viewed as the social benefit associated with applying the treatment technology to 
the last unit of 𝐙𝐓 that is consumed. 
Another limitation with the take-up framework is that, to identify this parameter of interest, it is 
necessary to impose restrictions on the functional form for aggregate demand: 
LINEAR DEMAND. Aggregate demand is linear in goods in 𝐙𝐓 if and only if the “own price 
effect” of the tax 𝜏 on quantity demanded of 𝐙𝐓 is constant with respect to the price. Hence, linear 
demand for goods in 𝐙𝐓 implies that, for all 𝑠 and 𝜏, 𝜕𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚( 𝜏, 𝑠) 𝜕𝜏⁄ = 𝛽𝐙𝐓𝐚(𝑠). The function 
𝛽𝐙𝐓𝐚:ℳ𝑠 → ℝ describes the own price effect on quantity demanded as it varies with the state of 
the economy. This function is constant with respect to 𝜏. 
 
CROSS-SAMPLE VALIDITY OF OWN PRICE EFFECT. For two aggregate demand functions 
𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚( 𝜏, 𝑠) and 𝑄𝐙𝐓′ 𝐚′( 𝜏′, 𝑠′), with ∫ 1𝑑𝐳𝐙𝐓 = ∫ 1𝑑𝐳𝐙𝐓′  and ∫ 1𝑑𝑖𝐚 = ∫ 1𝑑𝑖𝐚′ , cross-sample 
validity of the own price effect is satisfied if 
𝜕𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚( 𝜏,𝑠)
𝜕𝜏





For two aggregate demand functions 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚( 𝜏, 𝑠) and 𝑄𝐙𝐓′ 𝐚′( 𝜏′, 𝑠′) to satisfy cross-sample validity of the 
own price effect, the effect of the per unit tax 𝜏 on quantity demanded of 𝐙𝐓 by consumers in 𝐚 in state of 
the economy 𝑠 at tax level 𝜏 must equal the effect of the per unit tax on quantity demanded of 𝐙𝐓′  by 
consumers in 𝐚′ in state of the economy 𝑠′ at tax level 𝜏. We require that that 𝑄𝐙𝟎𝐈( 𝜏, 𝑠∗) is linear in 𝜏 
and that cross-sample validity of the own price effect is satisfied between 𝑄𝐙𝟎𝐈( 𝜏, 𝑠∗) and 𝑄𝐙𝜏𝐈( 𝜏, 𝑠𝜏). 
                                                          
19 We require that the two functions examine the demand for equally-sized sets of goods among equally-sized sets of 
consumers. Hence, we require that ∫ 1𝑑𝐳𝐙𝐓 = ∫ 1𝑑𝐳𝐙𝐓′  and ∫ 1𝑑𝑖𝐚 = ∫ 1𝑑𝑖𝐚′ . If this assumption is relaxed, then the 











Given these two conditions, the own price effect estimated from the price experiment is a 
constant slope that can be applied to the results from the take-up experiment:20
ESTIMATED PRICE EFFECT. The estimated price effect from the price experiment is the 
coefficient on 𝜏 from an ordinary least squares regression of 𝑄𝐙𝜏𝑖(𝜏𝑖 , 𝑠𝜏) on 𝜏𝑖. For a given 
sample size 𝑁𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, let this coefficient be denoted ?̂?𝜏. 
  
  
TAKE-UP ESTIMATOR. Our take-up estimator of the marginal surplus for the marginal treated 
unit of 𝐙𝟎 is denoted 𝑀𝑆�𝐙𝟎I









The difference inside the brackets is estimated from the take-up experiment and measures the effect of the 
additional unit of 𝑧𝑘 on demand for goods in 𝐙𝟎; however, this effect is measured in quantity units rather 
than dollars. To obtain a dollar measure, the researcher uses the price experiment to measure the effect of 
exogenous price shocks on quantity demanded. By cross-sample validity of the own price effect, ?̂?𝜏 is an 
unbiased estimate of 𝛽𝐙𝟎𝐚(𝑠∗), the own price effect for the take-up experiment. Dividing the quantity 
effect by negative one times the own price effect converts this quantity effect into a dollar-denominated 
measure of the benefit of the additional unit of 𝑧𝑘. 
Figure 6 illustrates this estimation strategy. The lower and higher curves plot demand for goods in 
𝐙0 and 𝐙𝑘. Prices in the take-up study are the same for goods in the two sets, and the difference shown 
along the horizontal axis illustrates the effect of the additional unit of 𝑧𝑘 on quantity demanded. 
Multiplying this difference by negative one times the slope of the demand curve gives MS, the vertical 
increase in the demand curve. This ratio gives the amount of the dollar subsidy for goods in 𝐙0 that would 
be required to increase quantity demanded by as much as the treatment did. 
One straightforward application of take-up experiments is audit studies. The classic audit study 
design involves two job applicants, one black and one white, who are given similar resumes and are 
trained to act similarly. In this setting, the consumer is the employer, and the product attribute is worker 
race. The difference in callback or hiring rates between the black and white applicants is used to measure 
the extent to which employers prefer workers of a certain race, holding other factors constant (Fix and 
Turner, 1998). Research designs similar to the take-up experiment have also been used to measure banks’ 
valuations of the race and sex of loan applicants and home sellers’ valuations of the race and sex of  
                                                          
20 In principle, linearity of demand is not required for identification. Aggregate demand could have curvature of 
unknown form that could be identified using nonparametric regressions on data from the price experiment. If, 
however, the price effect is estimated from an entirely different economy from that studied in the take-up 
experiment, it is unlikely that the curvature in demand would be similar across the two experiments. In the special 
case in which 𝐙𝟎 = 𝐙𝜏 and 𝑠∗ = 𝑠𝜏, so that a single economy is being studied, the curvature is likely to be similar 
across the two samples, and relaxing the linearity assumption would be appropriate.  
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potential home buyers (e.g., Hu, et al., 2010; Zhao, Ondrich, and Yinger, 2006). In some studies, 
applicants are not trained to act similarly, but researchers use propensity score matching to identify pairs 
of job or credit applicants or home buyers who are similar in attributes other than race or sex. 
“Correspondence studies” represent one variation on audit studies in which researchers generate resumes 
with randomized attributes including experience, education, and a signal of the applicant’s race or sexual 
orientation (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Weichselbaumer, 2003). In these studies, 𝐙𝟎 might 
represent the set of black workers in the data and 𝐙𝑘 could represent the set of white workers in the data. 
In order to convert these hiring effects from quantity units into dollar units, the researcher can use 
separate estimates of the hiring effect of subsidizing certain workers, as in Woodbury and Spiegelman’s 
(1987) experimental study that offered bonuses to employers for each worker hired from one of their 
treatment groups. The resulting estimator identifies the amount of the bonus for hiring a black worker at 
which the marginal employer would be indifferent between hiring a white or a black worker. 
In addition to studying discrimination, the design of the take-up experiment can be applied to 
attrition rates in experiments. An influential study by Philipson and Hedges (1998) suggests that 
Surplus 
𝑀𝑆𝐙0𝐈
𝑘 �𝑄𝐙𝑘𝐈(−𝛿, 𝑠∗), 𝑠∗� 
Demand for products in 𝐙0, 𝜏𝐙0𝐈(𝑄, 𝑠∗) 
Aggregate consumption of offered products 
 
Surplus equals zero  







researchers can use differential attrition rates between treatment and control groups in experiments to 
measure the extent to which consumers value the treatment. Using a strategy of this form, Rohlfs and 
Zilora (2013) examine the effect of being in the treatment group in the Tennessee STAR class size 
experiment on the decision to remain in the study. In that study, children who were assigned to large 
classes left the public school system at higher rates than did children assigned to small classes. In this 
context, 𝐙0 consists of a single good, education in a large class in Tennessee Public Schools. 
Similarly, 𝐙𝑘 consists of a single good, education in a small class in Tennessee Public Schools. The effect 
of being assigned to a small class on remaining in the school system measures the quantity difference 
shown on the horizontal axis in Figure 6. The slope of the demand curve is estimated using data from 
other studies of the effect of receiving a private school voucher on the decision to leave the public school 
system. Dividing the quantity effect by the voucher effect gives an estimate of the private school voucher 
amount that would be necessary to cause as many people to leave the school system as being assigned to a 
large class did. This ratio gives measures the dollar equivalent of the benefit of small classes. 
Another potential application of the take-up estimator would use data from the Moving to 
Opportunity Experiment (Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005). The population of interest in that study is 
individuals living in poor neighborhoods. Consumers in the treatment group were offered Section 8 
vouchers (which are long-term rent subsidies) as incentives to move to wealthier neighborhoods. 
Consumers in the control group faced no such incentive. In this context, 𝐙𝟎 represents apartments in 
wealthy neighborhoods, and 𝐙𝑘 represents the same apartments supplemented with Section 8 vouchers. 
The take-up rate in that study measures the extent to which offering the Section 8 vouchers caused 
consumers to move to wealthier areas. When combined with separate estimates of the slope of the 
demand for housing in a certain area, the effect of the voucher on moving measures the value that poor 
consumers placed on Section 8 vouchers. Estimates of the slope of the demand for housing in a specific 
area can be taken from studies of the migration effects of welfare benefits or state taxes (Gelbach, 2004; 
McKinnish, 2007; Rohlfs and Thompson, 2013). The resulting estimator measures the increase in welfare 
benefits or the reduction in taxes that the marginal person moving to a wealthier area would regard as 
equivalent to a Section 8 voucher. 
 
C. Placebo Consumers 
 Often, a randomized experiment is not ethical or feasible, and the MS must be identified using a 
quasi-experiment in which a certain set of goods is treated for every consumer: 
AGGREGATE TREATMENT. An aggregate treatment of attribute 𝑧𝑘 to a set of goods 𝐙𝐓 
involves the application of the treatment technology to goods in 𝐙𝐓 for every consumer in the 
economy. This treatment affects prices. The price schedule after the application of this treatment 
is denoted �𝑝𝑥𝑘 ,𝑝𝑧𝑘�, and the new state of the economy is denoted 𝑠𝑘. Consumer 𝑖’s optimal 
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consumption bundle after the application of the treatment is denoted �𝑞𝑥𝑖𝑘 , 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 �, and 𝑖’s new utility 
level 𝑢𝑖�𝑞𝑥𝑖𝑘 , 𝑞𝑧𝑖𝑘 � is denoted 𝑢𝑖𝑘. 
 
The treatment affects a positive mass of consumers and consequently changes the price schedule  
from (𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑝𝑧∗) to �𝑝𝑥𝑘 ,𝑝𝑧𝑘�. Any two goods may be complements or substitutes, and any of the prices in the 
economy could change as a result of the aggregate treatment. For simplicity, we do not explicitly model 
the case of endogenous attributes, in which attributes other than 𝑧𝑘 change in response to the treatment. 
Incorporating these endogenous attributes into the model is straightforward and does not alter any of the 
identification results; however, doing so complicates the notation. The case of endogenous attributes is 
discussed in the appendix.21
 One important difficulty that the aggregate treatment presents is that the shift in 𝑧𝑘 among goods 
in 𝐙𝐓 and the resulting shift in the price schedule both affect aggregate demand. In order to disentangle 
these two effects, we consider two types of consumers: 
 
AFFECTED AND PLACEBO CONSUMERS. There are two subsets 𝐚,𝐛 ⊂ 𝐈 of consumers, 
affected consumers in the set 𝐚, who value attribute 𝑧𝑘 in varying degrees, and placebo 
consumers in the set 𝐛, who place no value on 𝑧𝑘. Among the placebo consumers, given a tax 
𝜏 = 0 per unit of goods in 𝐙𝐓 and a state of the economy 𝑠𝑘, aggregate treated demand 
𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐛
𝑘 �0, 𝑠𝑘� of goods in 𝐙𝐓 equals aggregate untreated demand 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐛�0, 𝑠𝑘� of those goods. 
 
Given the definition of an aggregate treatment and the existence of placebo consumers, the 
placebo consumer study is described as follows: 
PLACEBO CONSUMER STUDY. Two economies are observed that are separated by time or 
geography. The state of the first economy is 𝑠∗. The second economy is identical to the first 
except that an aggregate treatment of 𝑧𝑘 is applied to the set of goods 𝐙𝐓, so that the state of the 
economy is 𝑠𝑘. In each economy, there is a set 𝐚 of affected consumers and a set 𝐛 of placebo 
consumers. Samples of 𝑁𝑎∗ affected and 𝑁𝑏∗ placebo consumers are drawn from the first economy, 
and samples of 𝑁𝑎𝑘 affected and 𝑁𝑏𝑘 placebo consumers are drawn from the second economy. 
 
In order for the placebo consumers’ behavior to be informative, it is necessary that their responses 
to the shift in prices are similar to the affected consumers’ responses. Analytically, we impose two fixed 
effects assumptions: 
FIXED CONSUMER AND STATE EFFECTS. At a given per unit tax 𝜏 for goods in that set, per 
capita quantity demanded of goods in 𝐙𝐓 for a group 𝐚 or 𝐛 of consumers is additively separable 
into a group-specific component and a component that is specific to the state of the economy. Let 
the functions 𝛼𝐙𝐓𝐚:ℝ → ℝ[0,+] and 𝛼𝐙𝐓𝐛:ℝ → ℝ[0,+] denote the group-specific components of per 
                                                          
21 The case of endogenous product attributes is mathematically equivalent to simultaneous changes in prices and 
wealth. Consider, for example, that, as by-product of the treatment, the good 𝐳 is converted into the good 𝐳′. From 
the consumer’s perspective, the new price 𝑝𝑧𝑘(𝐳) of the good 𝐳 might be very high, so that the good 𝐳 has be become 
effectively unavailable. The good 𝐳′, however, has become available on the market at the price 𝑝𝑧𝑘(𝐳′). From a 
seller’s perspective, a consumer who was previously endowed with units of 𝐳 that sold at the price 𝑝𝑧∗(𝐳) is now 
endowed with units of 𝐳′ that sell at the price 𝑝𝑧𝑘(𝐳′). 
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capita demand for consumers in 𝐚 and 𝐛. These components vary with the tax rate 𝜏 but are 
constant with respect to the state of the economy 𝑠. For a given state of the economy 𝑠, let the 
function 𝛼𝐙𝐓𝑠:ℝ → ℝ[0,+] denote the state-specific component of per capita demand. This 
function varies with the tax rate 𝜏 but is constant across consumers. For each tax rate 𝜏 and state 
of the economy 𝑠, 
𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚(𝜏,𝑠)
∫ 1𝑑𝑖𝐚
= 𝛼𝐙𝐓𝐚(𝜏) + 𝛼𝐙𝐓𝑠(𝜏) and 𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐛(𝜏,𝑠)∫ 1𝑑𝑖𝐛 = 𝛼𝐙𝐓𝐛(𝜏) + 𝛼𝐙𝐓𝑠(𝜏). 
 
The fixed consumer and state effects assumption requires that a shift in prices changes per capita demand 
of goods in 𝐙𝐓 in equal amounts for affected and placebo consumers. 
 The placebo consumer study measures the effects of an additional unit of 𝑧𝑘 on the quantity 
demanded of treated goods. As with the take-up study, we convert this quantity difference into dollar units 
using data from the price experiment. For the demand estimates from the price experiment to apply to the 
placebo consumer study, we require linear demand and cross-sample validity of the own price effect 
between demand among consumers in 𝐚 for goods in 𝐙𝜏 in the state of the economy 𝑠𝜏 and for goods in 
𝐙𝐓 in the state of the economy 𝑠∗. 
Putting these assumptions together, we obtain a straightforward estimator of the marginal surplus 
for the marginal treated unit: 
PLACEBO CONSUMER ESTIMATOR. Using data from the placebo consumer study and the 
price experiment, it is possible to identify 𝑀𝑆𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘 �𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘 �0, 𝑠𝑘�, 𝑠𝑘�. The estimator for this 
parameter is denoted 𝑀𝑆�𝐙𝐓𝐚
𝑘 �𝑄𝐙𝐓𝐚

















The intuition for the placebo consumers estimator is similar to that used for the take-up estimator. The 







∗ , measures the combined effect on quantity demanded of increasing 𝑧𝑘 for 
goods in 𝐙𝐓 and changing prices from (𝑝𝑥∗ ,𝑝𝑧∗) to �𝑝𝑥𝑘 ,𝑝𝑧𝑘�. Because placebo consumers do not value the 







∗ , only measures the effect of the 
price changes. Subtracting the second difference from the first produces an estimate of the effect of 




 converts it into dollar units, as with the take-up estimator. 
 This difference-in-differences approach can be used to measure the value of any intervention that 
affects some consumers and not others, where a purchase or action is required to receive the benefits. 
Section VII of this study applies this approach to measure the benefit that the marginal military recruit 
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placed on college tuition benefits. Policies that affect school quality could be evaluated by applying this 
approach to the housing market, where the placebo group would include non-parents or parents with 
children outside of the relevant age ranges for the affected school (cf. Caetano, 2009; Clauretie and Neill, 
2000). To evaluate changes in a job’s health care benefits, researchers could examine the effect of the 
extra benefits on the fraction working in that job, where the placebo consumers would include workers 
who are already covered through their spouses’ jobs (cf., Dey and Flinn, 2008). The placebo consumers 
strategy can also be used to evaluate policies affecting one group’s rights (e.g., same-sex marriage, 
“sanctuary cities” that do not enforce immigration laws, bans on Burqa-wearing) by measuring the effect 
of the law on the decision to live in the area for which the law applies. The affected group would 
constitute the group whose civil rights were affected by the law, and the placebo group would constitute 
consumers whose rights remained constant. 
Recent work by Rohlfs (2012) uses the placebo consumers approach to obtain two estimates of 
the cost of the Vietnam draft. The first estimate is based upon the decision to attend school in order to 
avoid being drafted. For young men who were draft age during non-war years, attending college provided 
only the benefits of education. For young men who were draft age during the height of the Vietnam War, 
attending college provided the benefits of education plus student draft deferments, which offered 
protection from the draft. Females, who were immune from the draft, are the placebo group (cf., Card and 
Lemieux, 2001). Using estimates of the effect of the draft on college enrollment, together with estimates 
of the effects of tuition subsidies on college attendance from Dynarski (2003), the MS of protection from 
the draft is estimated for the marginal college student. This MS measures the amount of the tuition 
subsidy that would be required to increase college attendance by as much as the Vietnam draft did. 
The second approach in that study examines the effects of draft lottery numbers on the fraction 
voluntarily enlisting in the military (cf., Angrist, 1991). For a young man who faced a high lottery-
induced risk of being drafted, voluntarily enlisting provided the regular costs and benefits of military 
service plus protection from the particularly unsafe and unpleasant service that he could expect if drafted. 
This effect on enlistment rates is converted into a dollar estimate of MS for the marginal recruit by using 
separate estimates of the effect of enlistment bonuses on the fraction enlisting in the military. This MS 
measures the amount of the enlistment bonus that would be required to increase enlistment by as much as 
the risk of being drafted did. 
 
D. Combined Price and Quantity Estimator 
The last estimator developed here is useful when an exogenous shock to 𝑧𝑘 does not substantially 
affect other attributes or substitute or complementary goods but may have price and quantity effects: 
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COMBINED PRICE AND QUANTITY STUDY. Two economies are observed that are separated 
by time or geography. The state of the first economy is 𝑠∗. The second economy is identical to the 
first except that an aggregate treatment of 𝑧𝑘 is applied to the set of goods 𝐙𝐓, so that the state of 
the economy is 𝑠𝑘. A sample of 𝑁𝑧∗ goods is drawn from 𝐙𝐓 in the first economy, and a sample of 
𝑁𝑧
𝑘 goods is drawn from 𝐙𝐓 from the second economy. These goods are indexed by 𝓏, and the 
researcher observes the prices 𝑝𝑧(𝐳𝓏) for each of these goods. Additionally, samples of 𝑁𝑞∗ and 
𝑁𝑞
𝑘 consumers are drawn from the first and second economies. The researcher observes quantity 
demanded of goods in 𝐙𝐓 for each of these consumers.  
 
In order to identify the MS for the marginal treated unit, we require that prices respond in a 
limited way to the intervention: 
LIMITED PRICE EFFECTS. The aggregate treatment only affects prices of goods in 𝐙𝐓, and it 
affects them by a constant amount. Hence, 𝑝𝑥𝑘 = 𝑝𝑥∗ , 𝑝𝑧𝑘(𝐳) = 𝑝𝑧∗(𝐳) for all 𝐳 ∉ 𝐙𝐓, and 𝑝𝑧𝑘(𝐳) =
𝑝𝑧
∗(𝐳) + 𝑟𝑘 for all 𝐳 ∈ 𝐙𝐓, where the premium 𝑟𝑘 on 𝑧𝑘 is constant across 𝐳. 
 
In addition, we require that the researcher have data from the price experiment, that linear demand holds, 
and that cross-sample validity of the own price effect holds between demand among all consumers for 
goods in 𝐙𝜏 when the state of the economy is 𝑠𝜏 and in 𝐙𝐓 when the state of the economy is 𝑠∗. 
 Given these assumptions, the price and quantity changes can be combined to estimate MS for the 
marginal treated unit: 



















The intuition for this estimator is similar to the logic presented in Section II about bias due to aggregate 
quantity changes. If only the price and quantity demanded of the product of interest change, then the 
vertical increase in demand is equal to the change in price minus the slope of the demand curve times the 
change in quantity demanded.22
 The combined price and quantity estimator can be applied in any quasi-experimental setting in 
which traditional hedonic or discrete choice methods are used. This estimator corrects the bias associated 
with ignoring aggregate changes in quantity supplied. This estimator is most applicable to products whose 
attributes are fixed and do not depend upon other consumers’ behaviors. Additionally, the aggregate 
treatment should be sufficiently small that it does not affect the prices of complementary goods. Rohlfs, 
 
                                                          
22 A similar approach can be used if there is a small number of observed attributes or prices that are affected by the 
aggregate treatment. In that case, the researcher must measure the effect of the treatment on each of those other 
factors. The researcher must also have separate “attribute experiments” or “price experiments” that measure the 
effects of those other factors on demand for goods in 𝐙𝐓. 
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Sullivan, and Kniesner (2013) use this quantity correction procedure as a sensitivity test in a study of 
consumer valuations of automobile air bags. In that case, an estimate of the price elasticity of demand for 
automobiles is taken from Sallee’s (2011) study of the effects of tax incentives on demand for the Toyota 
Prius. 
 
VII. APPLICATION TO THE GI BILL 
To illustrate the placebo consumer estimation strategy, we consider the economic value that 
military recruits place on educational benefits for military service. A typical hedonic study of the MWTP 
for educational benefits would measure the extent to which jobs with educational benefits pay lower 
wages than jobs without those benefits. Relatively few jobs offer such benefits, and those that do (such as 
service in the military) have substantially different types of compensation, workplace amenities, job 
requirements, and populations of workers than do jobs that do not offer such benefits. These correlates of 
job-specific educational benefits would bias labor market estimates of the MWTP for these benefits. A 
traditional quasi-experimental hedonic study would examine how wages change in a specific job when the 
benefits are offered. However, wages and benefits are often set simultaneously by the employer. A firm 
might offer a benefits package to increase its number of workers, holding wages constant, as the U.S. 
military has done. Additionally, by offering educational benefits, a firm attracts young applicants who 
value education. The quantity response and the change in the composition of workers would both generate 
bias in quasi-experimental hedonic studies. 
To obtain unbiased estimates of the MS for educational benefits for the marginal military recruit, 
we use the placebo consumers estimator. We use data from two Rand Corporation experiments. The first, 
conducted by Fernandez (1983), measures the extent to which changing the package of educational 
benefits offered to new recruits affected enlistment in the military. The second experiment, conducted by 
Polich, Dertouzos, and Press (1986), measures the extent to which cash bonuses affected enlistment. In 
both experiments, the benefits were only offered to “high quality” recruits who had high school diplomas 
and scored above the national median on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, and the benefits were only 
available to recruits who signed contracts to work in high need specialties. Additionally, in both cases, the 
benefits packages were randomly assigned across different areas of the U.S., and recruiters were given 
advertising money to promote the new benefits packages and enlistment in their regions more generally. 
Asch and Dertouzos (1994) provide a useful comparison of these two studies. 
Table 2 describes the benefits packages that were offered through the two experiments. In both 
cases, the control packages were offered in all areas in the year prior to the experiment. The typical Army 
contract was for three years; however, high quality recruits could sign up for two-year contracts. The 
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typical Navy or Air Force contract was for four years; however, three-year contracts were available. The 
enlistment bonus experiment did not offer bonuses for the shorter-term contracts. The GI Bill Experiment  
Table 2: Benefits Packages in Two Military Recruiting Experiments 
Panel A: GI Bill Experiment (Fernandez, 1983) 
 
Experimental 
Group Description of Benefits 
Control Program 
Two-to-one matching of up to $2,700 in education investments 
for all high quality recruits. An Army recruit enlisting in a high 
need specialty may receive a "kicker" of up to $6,000 in 
additional matched funds. 
  
Ultra-VEAP 




Same as control, but DoD covers individual contribution for high 
quality recruits in high need specialties. 
  
Tuition/Stipend 
$1,200/year in tuition assistance plus $300/month stipend (both 
indexed to cost of attendance) for up to four years for high quality 
recruits in high need specialties. 
  Panel B: Enlistment Bonus Experiment (Polich, Dertouzos, and Press, 1986) 
Test Cell A 
(Control) 
$5,000 bonus for high quality recruits signing four-year contracts 
in high need specialties. $1,500 to $3,000 bonuses available to 
high quality recruits signing four-year contracts in other needed 
specialties. 
  
Test Cell B Same as control, but $8,000 bonus for high quality recruits signing four-year contracts in high-need specialities. 
  
Test Cell C Same as Test Cell B plus a $4,000 bonus for high quality recruits signing three-year contracts in high-need specialties. 




provided benefits that increased with term length. For the Army, the maximum benefit levels of the Ultra-
VEAP kicker, the Noncontributory VEAP, and Tuition/Stipend policies were $6,000, $2,700, and $6,550 
more than for the control program. For the Navy and Air Force, the maximum benefits for the 
Noncontributory VEAP and the Tuition/Stipend were $2,700 and $18,510 more than for the control 
program.23
The treated set 𝐙𝐓 of goods consists of enlistment contracts in high need specialties; hence, the 
decision typically modeled as labor supply will in this case be viewed as demand for a job. Following the 
original studies, a semi-log (rather than a linear) functional form is used for the aggregate demand 
equation. For both experiments, the affected group 𝐚 consists of high quality potential recruits, and the 




Panel A of Table 3 presents estimated effects of the benefits packages on enlistment rates. 
 
25 
Rows 1 to 3 show the estimated effects of each of the educational benefits packages on enlistment rates. 
Numbers are presented separately for Army and Air Force recruits.26
The Hinkley confidence intervals in panel B are calculated according to the asymptotic 
distribution of the ratio of two normal random variables, as discussed in the appendix. Our estimates of  
 Rows 4 and 5 show the enlistment 
effects of bonus packages for three-year and four-year contracts, presented for all services together. Panel 
B presents estimates of the marginal recruit’s valuations of the three educational benefits packages 
provided in the GI Bill Experiment. The effect of bonuses for three-year contracts is used in the 
denominator for the Army; the effect for four-year contracts is used for the Air Force. Each estimate 
measures the bonus level that would increase recruitment by as much as the educational benefits did. 
                                                          
23 Assumes 8% annual growth for the indexed Tuition/Stipend benefits, as in Fernandez (1983). To compute these 
indexed amounts, personnel are assumed to enlist for the standard term length (three years for Army and four years 
for Air Force and Navy) and begin school immediately after completing service. 
24 Many of the high need specialties were only available for high quality recruits. Consequently, the market-level 
changes (including the effects of advertising) are measured using the placebo groups’ total enlistment rates rather 
than their enlistment rates in certain specialties. 
25 The raw data for the difference-in-differences do not appear in either study. In the GI Bill Experiment, the author 
presents estimated effects of the treatments on high quality enlistments and reports that, in the specifications with 
controls for local labor market conditions, the treatments had no effect on low quality enlistments (Fernandez, 1983, 
pg. 55). In the Enlistment Bonus Experiment, the authors use a regression-based approach that measures the effect 
of the treatment after controlling for month-to-month variation in the numbers of low-quality recruits. For both 
experiments, we suppose that the estimation procedures correctly identify the effects of the treatments, holding all 
prices constant. Additionally, in both cases, following Polich, Dertouzos, and Press (1986), the “composite” effect is 
presented here. This effect measures the log increase that the treatment generated in overall high quality enlistments, 
controlling for market-level changes, plus the log increase that the treatment generated in the fraction of new recruits 
who choose the affected specialties and term lengths. The standard errors for these effects are estimated under the 
assumption that the coefficient estimates are statistically independent. The percentage changes in Fernandez (1983) 
are converted into log effects using the delta method. 
26 Few Navy specialties were covered by the GI Bill Experiment, and the paper does not present separate estimates 
for Navy recruits. 
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Notes to Table 3: Estimates in panel are “composite” log effects, as in page 45 of Polich, Dertouzos, and 
Press (1986) that add together account the “expansion” effect of the increase in overall enlistments and 
the “channeling” effect into certain types of enlistment contracts. The valuation estimates in panel B are 
constructed by dividing the education policy effect by the bonus effect and dividing by (90.9/99.6)*4,000 
for Army and (90.9/99.6)*3,000 for Air Force to obtain a per 1981 dollar effect. The 3-year contract 
bonus effect is used for Army and the 4-year contract bonus effect is used for Air Force. Standard error 
and confidence interval approaches are described in the appendix. ** indicates 95% confidence interval 




Table 3: Calculation of the MS for Educational Assistance Packages 
Panel A: Log Increase in Enlistment Among Affected Contracts 
 
Policy Comparison Army Air Force 
1. Ultra-VEAP Kicker relative to Control Program 0.24 
 (only Army) (0.04)** 
     
2. Noncontributory VEAP relative to 0.08 0.18 











 All Services 
4. 
Test Cell B versus Test Cell A 0.46 
(additional $3,000 bonus for 4-year contract) (0.04)** 
    
5. 
Test Cell C versus Test Cell B 0.57 
 ($4,000 bonus for 3-year contract) (0.12)** 
    Panel B: Estimated Value of Educational Assistance Packages 
  
Army Air Force 
    
6. 
Ultra-VEAP Kicker relative to Control Program $1,886 
 (delta method standard error) (515.0)** 






Noncontributory VEAP relative to Control $638 $1,260 
(delta method standard error) (394.3) (638.0)** 





Tuition/Stipend relative to Control Program -$160 $1,524 
(delta method standard error) (378.8) (147.2)** 
[Hinkley 95% confidence interval] [-1,00.7, 621.8] [1,282, 1,880]** 
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the marginal Army recruit’s valuations of the three benefits packages are $1,886, $638, and -$160. These 
estimates imply valuations of $0.314, $0.236, and -$0.024 per dollar of maximum benefits. For the 
marginal Air Force recruit, we estimate valuations of the two packages of $1,260 and $1,524, or $0.467 




 This study extends the theory of hedonic estimation to incorporate three important aspects of 
markets for heterogeneous goods. First, many important product attributes are endogenous and change in 
response to exogenous shocks. Second, many heterogeneous goods have complements and substitutes, 
and exogenous shocks to the market of interest may affect the markets for those other products. Third, 
aggregate quantity supplied may change in response to an exogenous shock. For all three reasons, the 
benefits of an exogenous shock to one product attribute will not entirely be capitalized into the price of 
that product, and traditional hedonic estimators will produce biased estimates. New experimental and 
quasi-experimental estimators are developed that avoid these biases and are consistent in this general 
setting. These new estimators are more demanding in their requirements for data and exogenous sources 
of variation than traditional hedonic estimators are. A variety of such estimators are developed for settings 
in which different forms of data are available. One of these estimators is applied to measure military 
recruits’ valuations of subsidies for higher education. 
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